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BARGAINING OR BIOLOGY ?
THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF PATERNITY LAW AND PARENT AL STATUS
Katharine K. Baker*

Paternity suits make good headlines,1 but they often make bad law. The headlines are
news, no doubt, because people care as much about the tangential question, who was sleeping
with whom, as they do about the ultimate question, who is the father? This article will suggest
that whatever the allure of examining peoples’ sex lives, the law should abandon its interest in
determining biological paternity. The legal rights and duties of fatherhood should emanate from
commitment and contract, not from sex or genes.
Currently, fatherhood is a status that brings with it rights and obligations. For the most
part these rights and obligations attach regardless of whether one meets or exercises them. They
attach, at least according to paternity doctrine, by virtue of one’s blood connection to the child.
This article challenges that law of parental status at two levels. First, it demonstrates that often,
notwithstanding paternity doctrine, blood has little to so with one’s status as father. What matters
instead is one’s relationship with the mother. More specifically contract, or private bargaining
between individuals, often tells us more about who the law will consider a father than does
blood. Second, this article suggests that thinking about fatherhood as a fixed status is
*

Profess or of Law and Ass ociate Dean , Chicago-Kent C ollege of La w. Fo r helpful com m ents , I
would like to thank Lori Andrews, Sita Balthazar-Thomas, Naom i Cahn, June Carbonne, Ira Ellman,
Elizabeth Emens, Jill Hasday, Harold Krent, Michelle Oberman, Carolyn Shapiro, Kim Yuracko and
participants at workshops at Chicago-Kent, Florida State, Northwestern and University of Chicago Law
Schoo ls. Rayna M atcza k provide d su perb rese arch as sistance .
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See, e.g., Pat Mo ore, ‘I Just W ant to Know the Truth’; Man Seeks Proof That He’s Son of
Co nw ay T witty, S T . L OUIS P OST -D IS P A TC H (Mo.), Jan. 8, 1996, at 3E; Puzzle: Why Do Jacko’s Kids Have
W hite Skin?, P A L M B E A C H P OST (Fla.), Feb. 15, 2003, at 1D; Jefferson Fathered Slave’s Children,
Foundation Says, C H I. T RIB ., Jan. 27, 20 00, at 4N; Ice -T Hit W ith P ate rnity S uit, S A N A N T O N IO E XPRESS N EW S (Tx.), June 9, 2002, at 2J.
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problematic. One’s status as father (or mother) should depend on whether one exercises the
rights and fulfills the obligations of parenthood, not on whether one has a blood connection.
This second level challenge, to the idea of fixed fatherhood, is a logical outgrowth of the
first challenge, to paternity law, because it is the logical outgrowth of thinking about parenthood
as contract. If one fails to meet the obligations of a contract to parent, one can lose the rights that
the contract provides. By the same token, if one promises to perform the obligations of
parenthood, or performs them in a context in which a promise to do so can be inferred, then one
can be bound in contract, not because of one’s status, but because of one’s deliberate acceptance
of fatherhood.
The argument begins in Section I with a brief historical and contemporary explication of
the paternity suit. Section I then demonstrates just how little the law actually cares about
biological paternity by examining those cases in which the law rejects biology as a basis for
paternity. The last part of Section I analyzes potential rationales for holding a biological father
accountable as a father on the basis of biology alone. None of the rationales that might justify
holding biological fathers automatically responsible for the support of their biological children
can be reconciled with the case law, constitutional doctrine or contemporary mores.
Section II of the article suggests a different theory of paternity, one that can reconcile
much of the case law, constitutional doctrine and contemporary mores. It reveals that courts
often root paternal obligation in contract with the mother, not biology. This section shows how
contract theory is remarkably consistent with the traditional framework which let marriage define
paternity, appropriately parallels the contractual framework governing most parenthood decisions
in the reproductive technology area, is already operating in many of the equitable cases vesting
obligation in non-biologically related persons, and better reflects the way that fatherhood is
experienced by both parents and children.
Thus, Section I shows just how little paternity law is actually rooted in genetics. Section
II shows just how much it is rooted in contract. Section III moves from the descriptive to the
normative in order to explore the theoretical nature of that contract in more detail. First, it
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examines how contracting for parental rights fits the reliance and will theories of contract, the
consideration theory of contract and relational theories of contract. Section III then scrutinizes
the entitlements and obligations that are actually exchanged in these contracts. It suggests and
defends two ideas that are likely to be controversial. First, a gestational mother holds all initial
rights and obligations to a child.2 With some built-in limitations, parental rights and obligations
are the mother’s to contract away as she chooses. Second, the obligation to support a child can be
limited temporally, so that the paternal obligation reflects what was bargained for in the
agreement between mother and father, not a static notion of fatherhood. Section III concludes
with some examples of how the contract regime would work in practice.
Section IV explores the relative costs and benefits of embracing this contract model.
Among the benefits is the elimination of the current distinction between how parental status is
determined for parents of children born by virtue of reproductive technology and how parental
status is determined for parents of children born by virtue of sexual intercourse. Also eliminated
is the distinction between how parental status is assigned to straight and gay parents. The partner
of a gestational mother (or one who contracts with that mother) acquires parental rights and
obligations by virtue of an agreement with the mother, not by virtue of genetics. More important,
the proposal offered here recasts fatherhood as a truly volitional status, a set of rights and
obligations that one willingly agrees to. It does so, in part, by severing the the legal link between
sexual activity and reproduction, as medicine now routinely does, and as is necessary in order to
bring the law of parental status up to date with contemporary mores and the contemporary law of
sexual activity. The proposal also makes clear that if one does not fulfill the obligations of
fatherhood, one can lose the status of father, and if one enjoys the rights of fatherhood, one can
become a father.

2

Th is idea is not new . Martha Finem an endorsed a m oth er-focused fa m ily that elim inated all
notions of fatherhood almost ten years ago. See M ARTHA F INEMAN , T HE N E U T ER E D M OTHER , T HE S EXUAL
F A M IL Y A N D O T H E R T W E N T IE T H C EN TUR Y T RAGEDIES 228 -233 (199 5). This article does n ot go nea rly as far.
It endorses a fam ily structure in wh ich m othe rs ho ld initial rights and o bligation s, but in which those rights
and obligations a re alm ost always s hare d with fathe rs. Se e infra Sec tion III.
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Among the possible costs of the proposed system is increased direct state expenditure for
children. The state could no longer demand that the male participant in a heterosexual encounter
be automatically responsible for any biological issue of that encounter. It is not actually clear
that the proposed system would be more expensive than the current one because most of the men
who are now liable as genetic fathers would be liable as contractual fathers.3 Nonetheless,
without doubt, the system proposed here works best with greater government expenditure on
children. Mothers will be less vulnerable if the state takes more responsibility for supporting
children. Today, the United States is the only industrialized country, save China, to not provide
subsidies to the caretakers of children.4 Numerous eminent scholars routinely call for such
subsidies.5 If we embraced the caretaking norm that most of the rest of the world embraces, the
parental status model endorsed here would run little risk of making mothers too vulnerable.
Alternatively, as is the case in many other countries, biological fathers could be held
accountable for their reproductive activity without necessarily becoming legal fathers. Numerous
other countries make biological fathers reimburse the state for part of the support of their
biological issue, but what they pay is closer to a fine than a support obligation.6 Such a fine

3

See infra notes 169 -174 and text acco m pan ying.

4
See Social Security Administration, Research Report #65, SSA Publication No. 13-11805, Social
Security Programs Throughout the W orld - 1997 xxvi, xxx-xxxv, xxvi. The Personal Responsibility and
W ork Op portu nity and Recon ciliation Act of 1 996 , 42 U .S.C . § 101 et seq. P rovide s for “Te m pora ry Aid to
Needy Families (TANF )” but those subsidies, as the name so obviously indicates, are temporary and
needs-based. M ost of the res t of the world pro vides for caretak ers, regardless of their cla ss, for the fu ll
term of a c hild’s m inority.
5

See, for instance, Fineman, supra note 2 at 231-32 (suggesting “[w]e [s]hould face, value and
there fore sub sidize careta king and care takers.”) and Robin W est, The Right to Care in T HEORETICAL
P E R S P EC T IV E O N D E P E N DE N C Y: C O N S E Q UE N C E S F O R W O M E N A N D P OLITICAL L IFE at 88, 88 (E.Kitay & E.
Feder eds., 2000) (supporting a right to “doulia,” defined as “a right to some measure of state, social or
comm unity support for caregiving labor.”). See also Anne L. Alstott, W ork vs. Freedom: A Liberal
Challenge to Employment Subsidies, 108 Yale L. J. 967, 992-994 (1999) (endorsing cash payments for
single m othe rs in poverty).
6

See Alfred Kah n & S heila K am m erm an, Introductory Note: Child Support in Europe and Israel, in
C H IL D S U P P O R T: F R O M D EBT C O L L E C TI ON T O S OCIAL R ESP ON SIBILITY at 45-49 (A. Kahn & S. Kamm erman
eds. 1988)
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could deter irresponsible sexual behavior without making fathers out of people who never
intended to be or acted as parents.7
I offer these ideas in the introduction so as to assuage concerns about the ramifications of
adopting the proposed contract model. The semi-biological system we have now survives, in
large part, because of fear of what happens to children if we relieve biological fathers of
automatic parental responsibility. Thus, we let an incoherent, outdated and remarkably
inconsistent paternity system govern mostly because we are too scared of what happens if we
abandon it. As a result, we often let men who have enjoyed the benefits of fatherhood escape
parental obligation, we preference blood over nurturing in a way that denies functioning parents
rights, and we force men who never intended to be or acted as fathers, to be fathers. Both
children and adults deserve a system in which parental status is determined in a fair,
understandable and coherent manner. Contract provides that system and this article shows how.8
Before starting, a note on gender is in order. This article uses the terms mother and father
in their biological and social senses, not in the sense to which they refer to the sex of a person
who is parenting. I do this both for convenience (the parental roles have traditionally been so
gendered that it is much easier to refer to the gendered label than to describe the work being
done) and to underscore what can be important differences in the jobs that parents perform. Yet
women can father and men can mother. What is important is not the sex of the people performing
the roles, but how adults allocate the rights and responsibilities of parenthood. This is an article
about how and why the law should construe parental rights as a function of the private bargaining
between the adults who negotiate the rights and obligations of parenthood.

7

For more on the benefits of this idea, see infra notes and text accompanying 311-314.

8

Moving tow ards a parental rights regim e ro ote d in contract is a first ste p, a ste p that th is article
endorses. Deciding which particular contract doctrines will be most appropriate in what situations requires
m ore a nalysis. See infra text accompanying notes 209-217. For instance, the extent to which legislatures
should impose boilerplate terms, the applicability of third party beneficiary analysis and the use of
unc ons cionability analysis are a ll questions th at are left for anoth er da y. The thesis here is lim ited to
presenting contract as the appropriate construct through which to conceptualize the origins and obligations
of pa renta l status .
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I. The Incoherence of Paternity Law

A. The Origins of Legal Paternity

A biological father’s duty to support his non-marital children originated in England in
1576, as part of the British Poor Laws. Parliament passed a law allowing Justices of the Peace to
seek reimbursement from fathers whose biological children were receiving public assistance.9
Thus the paternal support duty originated as an attempt to help alleviate the state’s burden for
poor children. Children and unwed mothers of children who were not receiving public assistance
had no right to support from a biological father. It was not until 1844 that British unwed
mothers, regardless of their welfare status, acquired the right to sue biological fathers for
support.10
In this country, the rationale for and implementation of paternity obligations varied
widely. Several states developed the duty of paternal support in a criminal context, as an incident
of punishment for bastardy or fornication.11 Other states did not recognize any duty to support.
As late as 1971, Texas and Idaho refused to impose any support obligation on an unmarried
father.12 Virginia imposed an obligation only on unmarried fathers who voluntarily and formally
acknowledged children as their own.13 Other states acknowledged a duty to support but vested

9

V ITEK , D IS P U TE D P ATE RN ITY P R O C E E D IN G S § 1.02(3) (5th ed. 1997).

10

Id.

11

H AR RY D. K RAUSE , IL L EG IT IM A C Y: L A W

12

13

AND

S OCIAL P O L IC Y 109 (1971 ).

Id. at 22.
V A . C ODE A N N . § 20.61.1 (1960).
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the right to sue in the mother, not the child.14

In 1949, a North Carolina court explicitly denied

a child’s right to have his paternity investigated.15
In those states that did recognize a duty to support, the amount of the award was left to
the complete discretion of judges.16 Some states required that judges not take the child’s
illegitimacy into account when setting the support amount,17 but other states mandated it.18
Given the discretion vested in judges, there was very little to prevent a judge from awarding
whatever amount he felt appropriate. There were no rules or principles guiding the determination.
These vagaries are understandable given the mixed motives of traditional paternity law. As one
New Jersey court summarized: “Filiation statues are generally considered to represent an
exercise of the police power for the primary purposes of denouncing the misconduct involved,
punishing the offender or shifting the burden of support from society to the child’s natural
parent.”19 The amount of the paternity award and the person entitled to collect it can vary
significantly depending on whether the purpose of the award is to discourage the underlying
sexual conduct, punish the biological father for not marrying the mother, or support a child in
need of resources.

B. Current Law

In 1984, Congress imposed a degree of uniformity on paternity law. The Federal Child

14

IN D . C ODE A N N . § 3-625 (1968); S.D. C O D IF IE D L AW S § 25-8-5 (1969 ).

15

Allen v. H unn icutt, 52 S.E.2d 18 (N.C. 1949).

16

K R A U S , supra note 11, at 23.

17

Id.

18

Florida, for instance, had a separate statutory scheme for the support of illegitimate children,
setting the m onth ly am oun t of su ppo rt for illegitim ate children und er six years old at $40/m o. F LA . S TAT .
A N N . § 48-7-4 (1966).
19

State v. M., 233 A .2d 65, 67 (N.J . Sup er. Ct. App . Div. 19 67).
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Support Act of 1984 required all states to allow children to sue for paternity up until their
eighteenth birthday.20 The child’s right to sue is usually coterminous with the mothers, but the
mother’s right can be limited by statutes of limitations21 and by contractual agreement.22 The
child’s right to sue cannot be so limited.

The Child Support Enforcement Amendments of

198423 required all states to promulgate guidelines pursuant to which courts should award
support. These guidelines require that “all earning and income of the absent parent” be taken
into account in setting an award and that the award be based on “specific descriptive and numeric
criteria.”24 In reality, what this means is that all states have tables or formulas that set the child
support award as a percentage of income while allowing for a few discretionary variables to
overcome the presumption in favor of the percentage. In other words, far from the basic poverty
standard which served as the basis for the state’s right to reimbursement in the original paternity
suits, children are now entitled as much to what a father can give them as to what they may
need.25 Indeed, in virtually all states, a child’s entitlement to child support is determined as a

20

21

42 U.S.C.A. § 66 6(a)(5) (Supp. 198 5)
See for instance, 750 ILL . C O M P . S TAT . 45/8 (2003).

22
Contractual agreem ents limiting child suppo rt are subject to judicial scrutiny in order to ensure
that children ’s interests a re be ing se rved . Thus, m othe rs are us ually not allowed to waive all suppo rt,
Bu dnick v. Silverm an, 805 So. 2d 1112 (F la. D ist. C t. App. 2002), but th ey can lim it (often substa ntia lly)
the am oun t they wo uld oth erwise ge t. See Lester v. Lester, 736 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(m other’s decision to accept extra tuition in lieu of judicial re-adjustmen t of child support am ount binding);
Gerh ardt v. Estate of Moore, 441 N.W .2d 734 (W is. 1989) (mo ther’s lumpsu m settlement for child support
binding as aga inst m othe r, but not against the child).
23

Pub. L. N o. 94-378 , 98 S tat. 130 5 (19 84).

24
45 C.F.R. § 302.56(c) (2003). The Family Support Act of 1988 requires that the guidelines act
as re buttable presu m ptions . Pub. L. 100-485 , 42 U.S.C. § 667 (Supp. 1997 ).
25

Determining what a child “needs” inevitably requires a baseline determination. If we assume
that public assistance actually meets a child’s basic needs, then a need standard would obligate a
biological father to pay the public assistance amount and no more. If we assume that public assistance
does not adequately meet most children’s needs, how does one determine what need is? In the spousal
m ainten anc e co ntex t, statuto ry guide lines usua lly sugge st that courts de term ine ne ed w ith referenc e to
the stand ard o f living enjoyed during the m arriag e. E.g. 750 ILL . C O M P . S TAT . 5/504 (2003). Thus, the need
baseline is based on what the spouse enjoyed before. For many children subjects of paternity actions,
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function of the parent’s income, regardless of what kind of relationship that parent has with the
child or with the child’s other parent.26
The child’s entitlement also often attaches regardless of the biological father’s actions or
intent when creating the child. Many cases suggest that the child’s entitlement to support
emanates from the mere fact of biological connection. Thus, children who are born as the result
of acts that made their mothers guilty of statutory rape are still entitled to support from their
biological fathers.27

Fathers who were deceived about birth control and had no intent or desire

to bring a child into the world are nonetheless fully responsible for child support and have no
action in tort for their emotional or financial injury.28 In Budnick v. Silverman, a man who
entered into a Preconception Agreement in which the mother agreed not to identify him as the
father in any public way (including on the birth certificate) and not to initiate a paternity action
against him, was nonetheless responsible for child support when the woman did file a paternity
action because “the rights of support and meaningful relationship belong to the child, not the
parent; therefore neither parent can bargain away those rights.”29 Thus, much paternity law
seems to be based on a strict liability theory for genetic contribution. One is responsible for

there is no standard from before upon which to base a child support award because they have not lived
with the father who they are suing.
26

In one fam ous case a biological father claim ed that his paternity obligatio n should be lim ited , if
imposed at all, because of the mother’s misrepresentation about birth control. The court found the
mother’s actions completely irrelevant. The financial content of the child’s right to support was a function
of “the m ean s of th e pa rents ” and nothing else. In re Pam ela P. v. Frank S., 449 N.E.2d 713, 715 (N.Y.
198 3).
27

Kansas ex rel. Herm esm ann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 12 73 (Kan. 199 3); San Luis O bispo v.
Na than iel J., 57 C al. Rp tr. 2d 843 (C t. App . 1996); Mercer County Dep’t of Soc. Serv. v. Alf M., 589
N.Y.S.2d 288 (Fam. Ct. 1992) (defendant father’s mental disability, by virtue of which he may have a
statutory rape claim , does no t exc use his su ppo rt obligation).
28

W allis v. Sm ith, 22 P.3d 68 2 (N.M. 200 1) (father cannot sue in tort to recover com pensa tory
damages stemm ing from girlfriend’s misrepresentation about birth control); Moorm an v. W alker, 773 P.2d
887, 889 (W ash. 1989) (“the moral responsibility for creating a human life is not voidable as if sex were a
simple contractual transaction”); Pamela P., 449 N.E.2d at 715 (obligation must be determined without
“consideration of th e ‘fault’ or wron gful cond uct of one of the pare nts.”).
29

Budnick, 805 So. 2d at 1113.
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one’s genetic offspring no matter what the circumstances of that offspring’s creation. This kind
of strict liability regime makes sense if the right to support is the child’s right and if the child is
vested with that right by virtue of the biological connection per se.
The problem with this theory is that there are many, many instances in which biological
connection alone does not render a man responsible for the support of his offspring. One can
group the instances in which the state routinely ignores any right a child may have to support
from a biological parent into four categories: (i) the voluntary and involuntary termination of
parental rights, (ii) artificial insemination cases, i.e. fertilization that did not result from sexual
intercourse, (iii) cases in which the law presumes, declares or finds paternal obligation in the
absence of any evidence that the man obligated actually is biologically related to the child, and
(iv) cases in which the law holds a man responsible as a father because he has been acting as a
father, notwithstanding the knowledge that he is not biologically related.

C. Rejecting Biology

1. Legal Termination of Parental Rights

The state may divest someone of parental status if it finds, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the person is unfit to parent.30 In such a case, the parent loses all rights and
obligations to the child and the child has no claim to the adult’s purse. However, a parent cannot
necessarily relinquish his parental rights and obligations even if that parent claims that he is or
would be an abusive and neglectful parent. A parent who wishes to voluntarily divest him or
herself of all parental rights and obligations may do so only if the other parent of the child also
wishes that he relinquish his rights and if there is another person ready to adopt the child. Some

30

Santosk y v. Kramer, 455 U .S. 745, 768 (1982).
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states make this clear by statute.31 Others rely on case law. In In re A.B.,32 both mother and
father agreed that it would be better for the child if the biological father’s legal status was
severed so that he could not come between the mother and the child. The Wisconsin court
refused the severance because “[p]arental rights may not be terminated merely to advance the
parents’ convenience and interests, either emotional or financial.”33 This means that blood
automatically vests an unwilling man with parental obligation only as long as the state wants to
keep the man obligated. In most cases, the state takes its clues from the mother. If she wants to
continue to keep the biological father liable for support, the state will not relieve the biological
father of his parental obligation. If she is willing to sever the biological ties and have someone
else assume responsibility, the state will allow severance. Not only might this seem somewhat
arbitrary from the obligor’s perspective, the child, in whom the support right is vested, has no
say.34 A child who might want to continue to receive whatever support he or she could get from
a biological father will not be heard if there is another man willing to support. What this
suggests is that though a child may have some kind of right to be supported, he or she does not
have a right to be supported by a biological parent per se.

31

Arkansas processes privately filed termination petitions only in adoption proceedings. A R K .
C ODE A N N . § 9-9-220 (Michie 199 3). The state m ay file a term ination petition o nly whe n it is “attem pting to
clear a juvenile for perman ent placem ent.” A R K . C ODE A N N . § 9-27-34 1 (M ichie 1993 ). Delaware prohibits
termination of one parent’s rights unless there is a contemplated adoption unless “continuation of the
rights to be terminated will be harmfu l to the child.” D EL . C ODE A N N . tit. 13, § 1103(b ) (1993).
32

444 N.W .2d 415 (W is. Ct. App. 1989).

33

Id. at 419. See also In re D.P .C., 37 5 N.W .2d 221 (W is. Ct. App. 1985 ). On e California cou rt,
which ha s no t been cited or follow ed b y any othe r cou rt, cam e ou t differe ntly, In re Joshua M., 27 4 C al.
Rp tr. 222 (Ct. App. 1990 ).
34

One m ight argue that the state takes the child’s interest into account by using a Best Interest of
the Ch ild stan dard in evaluating all term ination and adoptio n decisions. In practic e, how ever, adoption s in
which there is a willing non-biologica l parent and a biologica l parent wh o wa nts to relinqu ish his rights
seem to be approved perfunctorily. At least 42% of all adoptions are step-parent adoptions. Victor
Eugen e Flango & C arol R . Flango, Ho w M any Children W ere A dop ted in 1992 , 74 C H IL D W E L FA R E 1018,
102 7 (19 95).
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2. Reproductive Technology and Fatherhood

The second category of cases in which biology alone does not control a man’s obligation
involves artificial insemination. Most states have statutes divesting a man who voluntarily sells
or donates his sperm of all parental rights and obligations, as long as the insemination using his
sperm is performed by a licensed medical professional.35

For cases in which amateurs succeed

in artificial insemination without the aid of a professional “the preconception intent of the
parties governs who are the legal parents after the child is born.”36 Thus, a man may knowingly
assist in the creation of a child, but if his preconception intent is that he not assume responsibility
for the child, he is not responsible, as long as the child is conceived by means other than sexual
intercourse.
The preconception intent standard is widely endorsed by commentators and courts alike
as the appropriate one to decide disputed parental rights issues stemming from reproductive
technologies that allow us to conceive without intercourse and separate genetic contributions
from gestational ones.37 It is completely inconsistent with the a strict liability regime based on
the child’s right to support from a biological parent, however. Budnick v. Silverman, the

35

Most states also have statutory provisions automatically vesting paternal rights and obligations
in a hu sba nd w ho c ons ents to his w ife being artificially insem inated by a licensed profess ional. See,
e.g., C AL IF . F AM . C O D E § 7613 (2003).
36

See Lori A ndre ws, Legal Aspects of Assisted Reproduction, 54 ANNALS
674 (198 8).
37

OF

N.Y. A CAD . S C I. 688,

See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477
(App. Div. 1994); Lo ri And rews, Legal and Ethical Aspect of New Reproductive Technologies, 29 C LIN .
O BSTET . & G YN . 190 (1986) (arguing the preconception intent should govern in cases of artificial
insem ination ); John Law rence H ill, W hat Does it Mean to be a Parent? The Claims of Biology as the
Basis for Parenta l Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. R EV . 353, 418 (1991) (“the intended parents should be considered
the ‘pa rents ’ of the c hild born of [repro duc tive techno logies ]”); Ma rjorie S hultz, Reproductive Technology
and Intent-Based Parenth ood : An O ppo rtunity for G end er N eutra lity, 1990 W IS . L. R EV . 297, 302 (“legal
rules governing modern procreative arrangements and parental status should recognize the importance
and legitim acy of individu al . . . intentions”). But see, Marsha Ga rrison , Law Making for Baby Making: An
Interpretive Approach to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HA R V . L. R EV . 835 (2000) (arguing that
parental determinations in cases of reproductive technologies should be governed by existing family law
rules, m any of which do not hono r intent).
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preconception contract case mentioned above, illustrates this anomaly perfectly. Mr. Silverman
claimed that the preconception contract in which the mother agreed not to name him or legally
pursue him as the father made him nothing other than a sperm donor, albeit one that donated the
“old-fashioned way.”38 He argued that he had no obligation because the Florida statute relieved
sperm donors of parental rights and responsibilities.39 The court held that the Florida sperm
donor statute did not apply to conceptions that happen the “old-fashioned way.” In other words,
a preconception contract is determinative if the conception happens in a “new-fangled” way, but
irrelevant if the conception happens by means of intercourse. Again, we see arbitrary
enforcement of a child’s right to support from a biological parent, but some assurance that the
child will be supported. Most reproductive technologies are expensive. Most of the people using
them with the intent of becoming parents have the ability and desire to support a child.40 Vesting
parental rights in those who spend money with the intent to support a child helps ensure that the
child will be supported.

3. Legal Non-Biological Fathers

The third category of cases in which the biological father is not held responsible for the
support of his child involves the law, by presumption or declaration, making someone else the
father. The most common example of this is the common law presumption that the husband of a

38

Budnick v. Silverm an, 805 S.2d 11 12, 1114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).

39

F LA . S TAT . ch. 742.14 (2001).

40

The ex cep tion to this is sim ple insem ination of a w om an w ho w ishes to bear a child herself.
This is relatively inexpensive and increasingly popular among unm arried women. If there is no husband
who, by statute, becomes the father of the artificially inseminated baby, the responsibility for supporting
the child falls solely on the wo m an. See, e.g., the discussion of C AL . C IV . C O D E § 7005(b) in Jhordan C . v.
Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 392 (Ct. App. 1986). “[T]he California Legislature has afforded unmarried
as well as married women a statutory vehicle for obtaining semen for artificial insemination without fear
that the donor may claim paternity . . .”That child becomes the m odern equivalent of fillius nullius. See
infra text ac com pan ying notes 87-91 .
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woman who gives birth to a child is the father of the child.41 For many years, Lord Mansfield’s
Rule prohibited either spouse from giving testimony that would cast the legitimacy of a marital
child in doubt,42 and a putative father did not have standing to challenge the paternity of a
husband.43 Thus, for most intents and purposes, the marital presumption of the husband’s
paternity was irrebutable.
The extent to which the modern marital presumption can be rebutted varies from state to
state.44 In most states, the husband, the wife and the putative biological father have the
opportunity to rebut, but that opportunity is temporally limited. A husband who has cause to be
aware that a child might not be related to him biologically, but who fails to question biological
paternity once he has reason to can be held responsible for child support.45 Comparably, a man
who knew that he was the likely biological father, but failed to bring an action in time, can be
barred from claiming any parental rights he might want to establish.46 As a matter of
constitutional law, the Supreme Court has said that a putative father has no constitutional right to
establish his paternity even if he has a relationship with the child, as long as the mother is
married to someone else and wishes to stay married to that someone else.47 By the same token, a
mother who wishes to bar a biological father from asserting paternity on the basis of the marital

41

This comm on law presumption is now codified in the UN IF O RM P A R E N T A G E A C T , § 7611(a)

42

Go odright v. M oss , 2 Co wp. 2 91, 98 En g. Rep. 1257 (177 7).

43

L ESLIE H ARRIS & L EE T E IT E LB A U M , F AM ILY L AW 1052 (2d ed . 2000).

44

Id. at 995.

(2000).

45

Markov v. Markov, 758 A.2d 75 (Md. 2000); See also In re Paternity of C heryl, 746 N.E.2d 488,
497 (Mass. 2001) (man was not husband, but did accept responsibility as father even after having reason
to believe he m ight no t be biologica lly related).
46

47

See 750 ILL . C O M P . S TAT . 45/8 (2003).
Michae l H. v. G erald D., 49 1 U.S. 11 0 (19 89).
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presumption is free to do so only if her marriage is still intact.48 If she is separated or having
difficulty with the man presumed to be the father of the child, the biological father may have
standing to sue. A judge evaluates the state of the marriage.49 Thus, the biological father’s rights
and obligations are dependent on what a judge thinks of the strength of a marriage that the
biological father has nothing to do with. No one has an obligation to tell the child any of the
facts that might be relevant to the child’s right to support from his or her biological parent. Not
only does this make it highly unlikely that a child will pursue his right to support from a
biological parent, it makes it highly unlikely that the child will learn the biological facts.
Preferencing stability over information in this way may make it more likely that the child will be
adequately supported, however. Men who live with children are likely to help pay for them,
regardless of whether those men are biologically related to the child.50 Vesting paternity in the
man living with the child may help ensure support.
The marital presumption is not the only presumption that vests paternal rights. Most
paternity statutes also presumptively name the man listed on the child’s birth certificate51 and/or a
man who “receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child” as
the father.52 In cases in which two of these presumption clash or where one of the presumptions
clashes with biological evidence, courts often resolve the issue with reference to a Best Interest

48

See B.S. v. T.M., 782 A.2d 10 31, 1034 (Pa . Super. 2000).

49

Id.

50

N AN CY D O W D , R E D E F IN I N G F A T H ER H O O D 26 (2000). Men are most likely to support children that
the y live w ith. T his is true even if the non-biologically re late d fa the r knows that the childre n he is
sup porting are not his biolog ical offspring. See also F RANK F U R S T EN B E R G , Good Dads - Bad Dads: Two
Faces of Fatherhood, in T HE C H A N G IN G A M E R IC A N F A M IL Y A N D P U B L IC P O L IC Y 193 , 204 (Andrew Cherlin ed .,
198 8).
51

E.g. 750 ILL . C O M P . S TAT 45/5 (a)(2) (2003); U N IF O RM P ARENTAGE A C T , § 7611(c)(1) (2000)
(though the birth certificate only creates a presumption if the man nam ed on the birth certificate and the
m other have attem pted to m arry after the child’s birth).
52

U N IF O RM P ARENTAGE A C T , § 7611(d) (2000 ).
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of the Child analysis, not by virtue of a blood test.53 It is not uncommon for courts to simply
refuse to order blood tests in a case of clashing presumptions.54 The courts do not want to know
the biological answer. Thus, a biological father’s responsibility may depend on whether a judge
thinks that someone else, albeit someone by law presumed to the be the father, is a better father.
Again, the child does not appear to have a right to support from a biological father, so much as he
or she has a right to support from someone in addition to a mother.
The Final Judgement Rule also effectively holds non-biologically related men responsible
for children whom they can prove are not their own. Once a child support or paternity order is
entered, it is very difficult to re-open it, even with definitive biological evidence.55 Many times,
courts simply refuse to order the blood tests that would make the biological evidence
compelling.56 Contemporary judicial refusals to order blood tests parallel the historic refusals to
admit testimony about “access”57 and they strongly suggest that the law treats paternity as a social
construction not a biological fact. The proposed Uniform Parentage Act limits anyone who has
formally acknowledged paternity to two years within which he can try to rescind that
acknowledgment, and then only on the basis of fraud, duress or material mistake of fact.58 Once
53

See N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 357 (Colo. 2000); Davis v. LaBrec, 549 S.E.2d 76 (Ga. 2001)

(sam e).
54

In re Kiana A., 93 Cal. App. 4th 110 9 (20 01); See also Monm outh County v. R.K., 757 A.2d 319
(N.J . Sup er. Ct. Ch. D iv. 2000).
55

See Ex parte State ex rel. J.Z., 668 So.2d 566, 569 (Ala. 1995) (“policy in favor of finality [of
pate rnity judgem ents ] m ean s that a prior adjudication sh ould not be subject to relitigation in the absence
of truly compelling circumstances”); Richard B. v. Sandra B.B., 625 N.Y.S.2d 127, 143 (App. Div. 1995)
(“unequivocal trend” ha s been to “zealously safeguard the welfare, s tab ility, an d best inte rests of the child
by rejecting u ntim ely challenges affecting his or her leg itima cy”).
56

A trial in judge in the case finally decided as In re Paternity of Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d 488 (Mass.
200 1), refused to order genetic testing notwithstanding a father’s post-support agreement motion stating
his belief that he was not th e biological fa the r. T he Suprem e Judicial Co urt im plicitly endorsed this
decision, suggesting that a refusal to order blood tests would be appropriate in light of “the weight of
authority enforcing the finality of paternity judgme nts.” Id. at 496.
57

58

See supra note 42.
U N IF O RM P ARENTAGE A C T , § 308 (2000).
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again, stability trumps information, but the child’s right to support from someone in addition to
the mother is protected.

4. Functional Non-Biological Fathers

Finally, some courts hold a man responsible for child support because the mother and
child have come to rely on that support. Originally, courts debated this issue in the context of
step-parents.59 Some step-parents who had provided support were not be allowed to withhold it
after divorce if the child and mother had come to rely on that support.60 Other courts, worried
about the incentive such rulings could have on potential sources of support, did not hold stepparents responsible even if the mother and child had relied.61 Today, genetic testing has greatly
expanded the class of cases in which reliance arguments are made. Because it is now possible to
positively exclude as biologically related men who have acted as fathers, many cases now
involve attempts by men who previously thought they were the father to absolve themselves of
support obligations when they learn definitively that they are not biologically related. In these
cases, some courts look to whether the functional father took affirmative steps to prevent locating
the biological father.62 Others simply require a finding that the child or mother relied on the de

59

Ste p-parents are always req uired to support children fo r whom they are acting in loco parentis
during their marriage. Thus, there is no question that a step-father has some responsibility to help clothe
and feed a child with whom he is living. The harder question is whether that obligation continues after the
step -father an d the child have sep arate d.
60

Miller v. Miller, 478 A.2d 35 1 (N.J. 1984).

61

In re Marriage of A.J.N. and J.M.N., 414 N.W .2d 68, 71 (W is. Ct. App. 1987)(“[t]his type of
family relationship should be encouraged rather than discouraged through the possible consequence of
bec om ing pe rm ane ntly financ ially obligated for child suppo rt.”); Knill v. Knill, 510 A.2d 546, 552 (Md. 1986)
(step-father who cared for child as his own was not estopped from denying paternity because “[s]uch
conduct is consistent with this State’s public policy of strengthening the family... [and he] should not be
pen alized fo r his cond uct...”).
62

W . v. W ., 779 A.2d 7 16 (Con n. 2001).
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facto parent.63 Technically, these courts estop men from denying responsibility for a child
because allowing them to do so would hurt the child. Often, these men have been deceived into
thinking that they were the father, but they are still found responsible if the child relied on the
mistaken fact of fatherhood.64

In this class of cases, knowledge of, availability of and the

liquidity of the biological father can be crucial. If the biological father can be found and is able
to support, courts often absolve the functional father of any obligation.65 If the biological father
is unknown or unavailable or broke, the functional father will be ordered to pay. Thus, the
functional father’s obligation is dependent on the availability and financial condition of a man
whom he has nothing to do with and may well have never met. Courts determine paternity in a
manner that protects a child’s right to be supported, but not the right to be supported by a
biological parent.

D. Rationale for Paternity Law

The above analysis suggests that far from reifying a child’s right to support from a
biological parent, what paternity doctrine endorses is a child’s right to support from two parents.
Paternity law is about biparenting as much as it is about biology. The rationale for such a
regime might be articulated this way: A child is best off with two parents, if no other man fills
the role, the biologically connected man should. There are several problems with this rationale.
First, it finds minimal support in history. As mentioned, the original justification for paternity
law was rooted in the state’s fiscal needs. The state may have hoped that the legal obligation to
support would force a marriage (and thereby secure two parents), but the legal obligation itself
63

Ma rko v v. Mark ov, 75 8 A.2 d 75 (Md. 2000); M .H.B . v. H.J.B., 498 A.2d 775 (N.J . 1985); W right
v. Ne wm an, 467 S .E.2d 533 , 535 (Ga. 1996).
64

Com m onw ealth v. And reas , 369 A.2d 416 (Penn. 1976 ); In re Paternity of Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d
488 , 500 (Mass . 2001).
65

Monm outh C ounty v. R.K., 757 A.2d 319 (N .J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000), citing M iller v. Miller,
478 A.2d 3 51 (N.J. 1984 ).
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did not create a father.66

Biologically-related men owed support but they could not petition for

custody or visitation.67 It has only been recently that unwed fathers who were adjudged
responsible could claim any paternal rights.68 Traditionally, a paternity suit did not give a child a
parent, it gave her a paycheck.
Things are different today. Men adjudged to be fathers have parental rights that they can
exercise so it is generally more accurate to view the paternity suit as giving a child a parent in
addition to a paycheck. Still, it gives a child an unwilling parent and it is quite unclear why that
is fair to the unwilling parent or good for the child. There are three possible answers. First,
holding an unwilling man responsible is appropriate punishment for the underlying conduct.
Second, children have a moral claim to their biological father’s resources. Third, the unwilling
man assumed the risk of pregnancy and can therefore be held responsible. The first of these
theories is father-driven. The second of these theories is child-driven.69 The third idea,
assumption of risk, collapses into the first two.
1. Punishment of the Father
Unquestionably, the punishment rationale was very much at the core of early paternity
doctrine. As the New Jersey court said in 1967, “filiation statutes . . . denounc[e] the misconduct
involved [and] punish the offender.”70 Various feminist scholars still defend paternity doctrine

66

See L AW RENCE S T O N E , T HE F AMILY, S E X AN D M A R R IA G E IN E N G L A ND 1500-1800 600 -650 (199 7).
Particularly am ong prop ertyless classes , the m othe r was ofte n co nten t with the financial settlem ent alone.
Id. at 641.
67

See K RAUSE , supra note 11, at 30-32. Before Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), unwed
fathe rs ha d no con stitutiona lly protecte d pa renta l rights to their ch ildren e ven if the m othe r died.
68

See, e.g., Illinois Parentage Act, 750 ILL . C O M P . S TAT . 45/2-3 (200 3).

69

I am grate ful to N aom i Cah n for und erscoring this distinction.

70

See State v. M., 233 A.2d 65, 67 (N .J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967).
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because they see it as necessary to curb irresponsible male sexual behavior.71

Paternity doctrine

also punishes men who cannot be considered irresponsible however. It makes male victims of
statutory rape responsible for child support72 and it carries no exception for male victims of
deceit and fraud. More basically, it punishes men for activity that enjoys considerable
constitutional protection.73 The most recent Supreme Court decision on the subject leaves little
doubt that there is some constitutionally protected right to sex,74 though that right is probably
limited to non-procreative sex.75 Nonetheless, given the special status of non-procreative sex, it
seems quite odd to punish people who, without any intent to do so, engage in procreative not
non-procreative sex. Admittedly, men can and almost certainly should use their own form of
birth control more often than they do if they do not wish to be fathers, but birth control does fail
and couples routinely rely on a woman’s representation as to her own use of birth control.
Condoms cannot completely solve the problem of unwanted fatherhood any more than birth
control pills and diaphragms can solve the problem of unwanted motherhood. To the extent that
paternity doctrine is still rooted in punishment, we punish men who, in many instances, have
done nothing wrong.
2. Entitlement of the Child
The other rationale for holding unwilling men responsible as fathers, that children have a

71

Na ncy D . Polikoff, The Deliberate Construction of Families Without Fathers: Is It an Option for
Lebsian and Heterosexual Mothers?, 36 SANTA C LARA L. R EV . 375, 375-76 (199 6); D O W D , supra note 44 at
174-75.
72

See supra notes 21 and 22 and text acco m pan ying.

73

L AURENCE H. T RIBE, A M E R IC A N C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW § 15-2 at 1421-3 1, 1435 (2d ed . 1988);
Sylvia A. L aw, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 W IS . L. R EV . 187; Robin W est,
Integrity and Universality: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s Freedom’s Law, 65 F O R D H AM L. R EV . 1313,
132 5 (19 97).
74

Lawrence v. Texas, 156 L. Ed. 2d 508 (2003). See also generally, David B. C ruz, “The Sexual
Freedom Cases”? Contraception, Abortion, Abstinence and the Constitution, 35 H A R V . C.R .-C.L., L. R EV
299 (2000 ).
75

See Cru z, supra note 74.
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moral claim to their fathers resources, may have more weight. Judges and commentators talk in
terms of the child’s “natural” right to his father’s resources.76 Causation, not punishment, seems
to underlie this rationale. “But for” the father’s sexual activity, the child would not have been
born. Therefore the child has a right to the father’s financial support. The problem with this
formulation is that given the constitutional treatment of reproductive decision-making, the
mother is the far better proximate cause of the child’s existence. She has significantly more
control over the decision to become a parent. If part of what the constitution protects is the right
of “the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to . . . beget a child,”77 the
constitution protects women better than men. Once the child is conceived, a man has no right to
terminate the pregnancy78 and the law will hold him accountable as father even if he had no past
and has no present intent or desire to parent. He cannot relinquish parental status unless the
mother and the state are willing to let him relinquish that status.79
This disparate treatment of men and women may be justified. The significant emotional
and physical burdens of pregnancy80 make any decision to beget a child necessarily much more

76

See, e.g., W einand v. W einand, 616 N .W .2d 1, 6 (Neb. 2000 ) (“The statutory duty to suppo rt
[the child] is placed squarely upon her natu ral parents ”) (emp hasis adde d). “A Child has an unequivocal
m oral claim on those res ponsible for conception who have not m ade alternative pro visions for the child’s
well-being.”Jun e Carbo ne a nd N aom i Cah n, The Genetic Tie (draft on file with author). Blackstone,
although a strong advocate of the marital presumption, also suggests that the “duty of parents to provide
for the maintenance of their children, is a principle of natural law.” 1 W IL LIA M B L A C KS T O N E, C OMMENTARIES
*446-47.
77

Eise nsta dt v. Ba ird, 405 U.S . 438, 453 (197 2); See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 852 (1992) (“[I]n some critical respects the abortion decision is of the same character as the
decision to use con traception, to which Griswold v. Conne cticut, Eisenstadt v. Baird, and Ca rey v.
Population Services International afford constitutional protection. W e have no doubt as to the correctness
of those dec isions.”).
78

Casey, 505 U.S. at 894-95.

79

See supra Section IC1.

80

Eileen McDonagh, My Body, My Consent: Securing the Constitutional Right to Abortion
Funding, 62 ALB . L. R EV . 1057, 1073-7 4 (19 99) (des cribing the severe ph ysical bu rden s of p regn anc y).

21

Bargaining or Biology?
arduous for women than men. Thus, it is much more important that a woman be free from state
interference into the decision to beget a child because the process of begetting is so much more
difficult for her. Moreover, as several scholars have argued and as many more have observed,
mothering and fathering, at least as constructed and lived in this society, are usually very
different tasks.

Mothering a child who has already been born is much more emotionally and

physically taxing than fathering that child.81 Given the financial tradeoffs that women routinely
make when they mother, it is also more expensive than fathering. 82 As the Supreme Court has
repeatedly found,83 men and women are often not similarly situated with regard to parenthood.
The fact that most fathers are not mothers, does not necessarily justify making unwilling
men fathers, however. The truth is we force fatherhood on men in a way we do not force
motherhood on women and we do that in the name of protecting a child’s right to support from
biological parents even though the law routinely ignores, obfuscates or simply rejects biology as
the basis for parenthood. As we saw in Section IC, the law does not protect a child’s right to
support from a biological parent, though it may protect a right to support from some one in
addition to the mother. Why should the child have a moral entitlement to support from a
biological parent only sometimes?
3. Assumption of Risk
Perhaps the answer lies in an assumption of risk. When engaging in sexual intercourse,
men assume the risk that a court will not find someone better suited to be the father of any
81

Ma ry Bec ker, Materna l Feelings: M yth, T abo o, and Child Custo dy, 1 S. C AL . R EV . L. & W OMEN ’S
S T U D . 133 , 142-53 (199 2); F INEMAN , sup ra no te 2.
82

W omen tend to mother by sacrificing job opportunities and career advancement. Men typically
fathe r by not sac rificing those things . See generally Joa n C. W illiam s, De con struc ting G end er, 87 M IC H . L.
R EV . 797 (1989 ).
83

Lehr v. Ro berts on, 463 U .S. 24 8, 266-67 (198 3) (biologica l fathers no t necess arily entitled to
block adoption if they do not have relationship with mother and/or child); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420,
435 (1998 ) (to transmit citizenship to foreign born illegitimate child, citizen mothe r perform s neces sary
sub stan tive contac t at birth, bu t fathe r m ust s how he acted , befo re ch ild turned 18 , in m ann er su fficient to
estab lish paternity); Nguyen v. IN S, 5 33 U.S. 5 3, 68 (2 001) (knowledge of child and fa ct o f pa renth ood is
esta blishe d at birth for m othe rs bu t not fathers and there fore it is perm issible for citizenship statute to
distinguish betw een m othe rs an d fath ers withou t violating e qua l protec tion).
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potential child. Perhaps regardless of whether they have done anything wrong by engaging in
intercourse, and regardless of how much more say a woman has in bringing the child into the
world, men should still share some of the risk of unwanted pregnancies.

Forcing men to assume

this risk would help deter them from engaging in irresponsible sexual behavior and would honor
whatever duty flows from blood connection.
Accepting the legitimacy of either of these assumption of risk arguments, which are
essentially deterrence and moral obligation arguments, hardly requires endorsing paternity
doctrine, however. First, if the concern is deterrence, why do we choose to deter with paternal
status? The involuntary imposition of the status of fatherhood on unwilling men says
something rather disturbing about our notion of fatherhood. When we use paternal status as a
deterrent, we imbue that status with a negativity that diminishes those men who fulfill the role
willingly and honorably and lovingly. It is odd that we “deter” the reckless philanderer by
imposing on him the same obligation we impose on a man who purposefully helps bring a child
into the world and willingly nurtures that child. We impoverish children’s and adults’
understanding of fatherhood when we make it about resources and only resources.84
Second, if the concern is moral obligation to blood dependents, one must ask why we
treat the moral obligation to young dependents so vastly differently than the moral obligation to
old dependents. The Social Security system in this country makes the dependency of the elderly a
social concern. The young and able-bodied pay money into an entitlement program for the
elderly.85 In contrast, paternity doctrine and the state’s remarkably stingy support of children
make children’s dependency a private concern. It is hard to see why an adult’s moral obligation
to a child he never wanted or intended to have is greater than his moral obligation to parents who
probably wanted and almost certainly sacrificed for him. The obsession the law seems to have

84

A tax on biological fathers, as mentioned in the introduction and as discussed infra text
acc om pan ying 311-31 4co uld ad equ ately serve a deterrent func tion without m aking un wan ted m en fa thers .
85

For a discussion of how the social security benefit system actually operates, see Regina T.
Jefferson, Privatization: Not the Answ er for Social Security Reform, 58 W ASH . & L EE L. R EV . 1287 (20 01).
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with protecting a child’s “right” to support from someone in addition to the mother,86 helps keep
children’s dependency private, but why? We collectivize our moral responsibility for the elderly,
why do we refuse to do the same for the young? 87
Third, it is not at all clear that enforced fatherhood in these circumstances is good for the
child even if it does provide the child with some resources.88 The harm that comes to the child
from the animosity between parents can easily outweigh whatever benefit more resources bring. 89
In all likelihood, the child would be better off with resources emanating directly from the state
rather than from a reluctant father who is not likely to pay very much90 or very consistently91 and
is unlikely to assume a meaningful role as father.92 If our concern is children why we do we
86

See su pra Section IC.

87
As also mentioned in the introduction and as discussed more fully infra text accompanying
notes 307-310, most of the rest of the industrialized world does collectivize moral responsibility for the
young.
88

Studies of unmarried women’s attempt to collect child support suggest that the costs to the
children stemm ing from friction between the parents may outweigh the benefits gained by any added
sup port the biological father is able to give. Sara Mc Lan aha n et al., Child-Support Enfo rcem ent and C hild
W ell-Being: Greater Security or Greater Conflict, in C H IL D S U P P O R T A N D C H IL D W ELL -B E IN G 239, 254 (Irw in
Garfinke l et al. eds., 1994)
89

Id.

90

Studies indicate that approxima tely 2 of every 10 fathers were un em ployed the week be fore
being interviewed and 56% of unwed fathers live below or just above the poverty level. Sara McLanahan
et al., The F ragile Families and Child W ellbeing Study, Baseline National Report 3, 10-11 (Bendheim Th om an C tr. for R ese arch on Child W ellbeing , Princeton U., M ar. 20 03), available at
http://crcw.princeton.edu/files/nationalreport.pdf. Researchers hypothesize that over one quarter of unwed
fathe rs are no t steadily em ployed . W end y Sigle-R ush ton & Sara M cLa nah an, For Riche r or Poorer:
Marriage as an Anti-Poverty Strategy in the United States 13 (working paper, Bendheim-Thoman C tr. for
Re sea rch on C hild W ell-being, Princeto n U., June 20 03), available at
http://crcw.princeton .edu /working pap ers/W P01-17 -FF -Sigle.pdf.
91

T IMOT HY G RALL , U.S. C ENSUS B UREAU , C USTODIAL M O T H E RS A N D F A T H ER S A N D T H E IR C HILD
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Lin & Sara McLanahan, Parents’ Judgments About Nonresident Fathers’ Obligations and Rights 16
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assume that children will be better off with unwilling and resistant fathers?
The inability to answer these questions convincingly suggests that none of the rationales
for biological paternity doctrine survive scrutiny. If the current doctrine is rooted, as the
traditional doctrine was, in relieving the state of the burden to support, only those biological
fathers of children receiving public assistance should be liable. If the current doctrine is rooted
in punishment, we should not hold male victims of rape and deceit liable, and we are left having
to explain why behavior that the state has no business regulating becomes behavior that the state
can punish merely because of the (common) failure of a birth control method. We also must ask
whether the punishment of fatherhood fits the crime of procreative sex, and, more fundamentally,
whether we want fatherhood to be considered a punishment. If the doctrine is rooted in the
child’s needs, then what the father owes should be a function of other resources available to the
child. A child-centered approach would make both the award and the determination of obligation
a function of the child’s needs, not the father’s ability. If the current doctrine is rooted in the
child’s moral entitlement to support from his or her biological father, one cannot explain the
myriad of presumptions that preclude the child from suing and often from even finding her
biological father and one must confront the fact that we force this moral obligation on men in a
way that we do not force it on women. We also must ask why we make the parent-to-child
obligation to support private, while we make the child-to-parent obligation to support public and
whether the child is actually better off with an unwilling father.
The next section explores an alternative theory that does a better job of explaining legal
fatherhood. It suggests that a man’s explicit or implicit agreement with a child’s mother provides
a more comprehensive framework for understanding paternity.

II. Contracting for Paternity

(working pap er, Bendheim -Thom an Ctr. for Rese arch on C hild W ell-being, Princeton U., June 2 000),
ava ilable at http://crcw.princeton.edu/wo rkingpape rs/W P00-03 -FF-Lin.pdf.
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Perhaps surprisingly, the law is remarkably comfortable letting contract confer parental
status. Indeed, to the extent that the marital presumption used to reign supreme, contract as a
basis for paternity has more historical support than does biology.93 The law of legitimacy (which
lets the marital contract determine paternal relationships) predates the law of paternity by at least
a thousand years.94 Today, it is contract that currently governs the law of paternity in almost all
cases involving non-traditional means of conception and it is increasingly contract that governs
the law of paternity in most cases involving men who have acted like fathers toward a child.
This section explores the reliance on contract in more detail.

A. The Marital Presumption as Contract

For most of western history, marriage, not blood, determined fatherhood. Evolutionary
biologists may tell us that genes determine fatherhood,95 but the law has always told us
something else. For the Romans and the pre-sixteenth century British, many children simply had
no fathers. A child born out of wedlock was filius nulius, or child of nobody. 96 As mentioned
earlier, a child born in wedlock was the child of the husband unless evidence showed that the

93

For a brief discussion of the extent to which it is appropriate to treat marriage as a contract, see
infra notes 99 -103 and text acco m pan ying.
94

See Jos eph C. Ayer, Jr., Legitimacy and Marriage, 16 H A R V . L. R EV . 22 (1902 ).

95

See ge nera lly, R OBERT W R IG H T , T HE M ORAL A NIMAL (1994); R IC H A R D D A W K I N S , T HE S ELFISH
G ENE (1989). Close read ing of the evolutionary biology literature also reveals that the best reprodu ctive
strategy for men is actually to have some offspring whom they do not father, that is, to have some
offs pring who are p rovide d for by othe r m en. F or an exp lication, see K atha rine K . Bak er, Gender, Genes
and Choice: A Comparative Look at Feminism, Evolution and Economics, 80 N.C. L. R EV . 465 (200 2).
96

See Ayer, supra note 94. See also 1 B L A C KS T O N E, supra note 70, at *458-59. The patriarchy
implicit in the illegitimacy doctrine is implicit in the phrase filius nulius. An illegitimate child was considered
the child of nobody even though it was perfectly clear who his or her mother was. It was only the father
who was m issing .

26

Bargaining or Biology?
husband had no “access” to his wife97 but neither husband or wife could testify to non-access.98
Moreover, a child born two weeks into a marriage, was just as legitimate as the one born 40
weeks into the marriage. Although there were disturbing racial exceptions to the marital
presumption and some men might have been able to establish illegitimacy of a marital child if
they wanted to,99 the law was indisputably comfortable with letting marriage determine paternity.
A man became a father by marrying, and only by marrying, a woman.
There may have been both stability and practicality reasons for letting marriage be the
arbiter of paternity. Asking biological questions, the answers to which can disrupt families, crush
existing relationships, and reveal disquieting truths about the reality of sexual behavior may do
more harm than good.100 Moreover, historically, it was often impossible to get an accurate
answer to paternity questions. Before genetic testing,101 proving paternity was even harder than
proving other notoriously difficult to prove sexual acts, like adultery or rape. With paternity, the
question is not just whether a sexual act took place, but whether the particular sexual act was the
one that led to the birth of a child. With no real way to ascertain a reliable answer, there was

97

Originally the lack of access could be established only if the husband was “beyond the four
seas of E ngland.” See In re Find lay, 253 N.Y. 1 , 7 (1930).
98

See Ma ry Louise Fellows , The Law of Legitimacy: An Instrument in Procreative Power, 3
C O L U M . J. G E N D E R & L. 495 , 498-99 (199 3).
99

As Professor Fellows insightfully details, 19th century American courts did not apply the marital
pres um ption in cas es inv olving c hildren who had Africa n-Am erican fea tures . Id. at 500. Moreover, the fact
that some people could testify to non-access, even if the husband and wife could not, suggests that the
courts wan ted to afford m arried me n som e protection against having to support children who d id not share
their ge netic m aterial. Id. at 507.
100

Paternity cases have always been “sordid spectacles” and the parties on all sides often wanted
to avoid them. K RAUSE , supra note 11, quoting M AXINE B. V IR T U E , F AM ILY C A S E S IN C O U R T 36-3 7 (19 56).
101

Although various forms of blood testing appeared first in the 1930s, and experts interpreting
those tests often gave statistical probabilities that sounded de terminative (i.e., a 95% chance of paternity),
m ost of that testing c ould not prove paternity. See Ira Ellman & David Kaye, Probabilities and Proof: Can
HLA and Blood Group Testing Prove Paternity?, 54 N.Y.U. L. R EV . 1131 (1979). It has only been the last
10 years’ advances in D NA m atc hing that have allowed us to dete rm ine paternity reliably. D A V ID F AIGMAN ,
D A V ID K AYE , M ICHAEL S AKS & J O S E PH S A N D E R S, M O D E R N S C IE N T IF IC E V ID E N C E : T HE L A W A N D S C I EN C E O F
E XPERT T E S TIM O N Y § 19-1.4 (1 997 ).
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little point in asking the question.
Marriage was the arbiter because the law needed some arbiter; biological questions were
too messy. One might ask why the law needed an arbiter at all though. Why insist that certain
children have legal fathers when children of unmarried mothers did not? The answer seems to be
in part to protect (at least some) children and in part to respect the institution of marriage. In his
Commentaries, Blackstone writes that these two goals were actually one.

“[T]he main end and

design of marriage . . . [is] . . . to ascertain and fix upon some certain person to whom the care,
the protection, the maintenance and the education of the children should belong. . . .”102 This
view suggests that at its core, the agreement to marry was about children as much if not more
than it was about husband and wife. The state supported marriage because it was through
marriage that children got support.

If the “main end and design” of the agreement to marry was

to support children, then sub-agreements or assumptions about fidelity needed not trump the
primary obligation to support children.
An early British court deciding an awkward legitimacy case in 1304 placed the sanctity of
marriage, not children, at the core of the marital presumption. The court would not question the
paternity of a child born to a woman whose husband had been abroad for three years because
“the privity between a man and his wife cannot be known.”103 In other words, the law treated the
decision to marry as primary. It was not the law’s place to interfere with the unit created by
marriage, regardless of what transpired during the marriage.
In Goodright v. Moss, 104 Lord Mansfield seemed to echo this view, though he also
emphasized the collateral benefit of supporting children. The bar to husband and wife testifying
about access was “a rule founded in decency, morality and policy, that they shall not be permitted
to say after marriage, that they have had no connection, and therefore that the offspring is

102

1 B L A C KS T O N E, supra note 76, at *444 -45.

103

Y.B. 32 & 33 Edw . 1 (R.SA.) 60, 63 (13 04) (Hengm an J .), quote d in W IL LIA M M C G O V E R N , J R .,
S H E L D ON F. K URTZ & J A N E L L EN R EIN , W ILLS, T R U S T S A N D E STATES 35 n.23 (1988 ).
104

98 Eng. R ep. 1257 (177 7).
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spurious.” Lord Mansfield, like the court in 1304, argues that marriage links two people together
and the law has no place weakening that link. Marriage is a contract to be together and
regardless of whether the wife was also “together” with someone else, she is still in a unit with
the husband.
To be sure, honoring contract was not the only reason for preferencing marriage over
blood. Using marriage not blood also helped ensure the orderly distribution of property. Indeed,
one might reject Blackstone’s view that marriage was an institution designed primarily to protect
children and instead argue that marriage was an institution designed primarily to facilitate the
orderly distribution of property. It is far easier for a probate court to identify the children of an
intestate’s marriage than all the children whom the intestate may have begotten. Moreover, given
marriages’ ability to regulate women’s sexual behavior, marriage was a way of helping steer a
man’s property to his biological issue. As long as wives were not allowed to engage in sexual
relations with anyone other than their husbands, husbands could fairly safely assume that
children of the marriage were “their” children. The problem, of course, is that infidelity is as old
as the institution of marriage.105 The marital presumption of paternity and the evidentiary rules
about testifying to access were necessary because everyone has always acknowledged that
marriage is an imperfect protector of biological inheritance lines.
A full historical discussion of the reasons for the elevation of marriage over blood is
beyond the scope of this article. What is clear, though, is that by preferencing marriage, the law
was preferencing a kind of contract. Of course, “marriage... is something more than a mere
contract”106 and I do not mean to suggest that contract doctrine can or should be used to govern
all aspects of the marital relationship. The law has never done so and there are sound reasons for

105

Indeed, possibly older than marriage. Sarah Blaffer Hrdy has documented how female apes
who are supposed to be “loyal” to the male head of their troop, often stray away in search of other
com pan ions. Sara h Blaffer H rdy, Em pathy , Po lyandry and the M yth of th e C oy Fe male, in F EMINIST
A P P R O A C H E S TO S CIENCE 119 -20 (Ru th Bleier ed., 1986).
106

Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-11 (188 8).
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it continuing to adopt contract principles reluctantly. 107 The inescapable fact though, is that the
joint decision to enter into a marriage looks more like contract than anything else.108 It may be a
contract to enter into a status,109 but the agreement to enter that status must be a mutual one that
involves rights and duties for both parties.110 Traditionally, by agreeing to enter into that status,
husband and wife were agreeing to support and raise any children born to the marriage. Because
husband and wife agreed to raise children, they were bound to be father and mother, regardless
of whether the children born to the marriage were biologically related.

B. The New-Fangled Way: Parenthood by Express Contract

A great many children today are conceived by means other than sexual intercourse.111
Courts, with the weight of scholarly commentary behind them, almost always use contract to
determine who the parents of these children are. In the most common and familiar case, the
biological father of a child born by virtue of insemination through a sperm bank has signed away
his rights and obligations as a father. The law honors the sperm donor’s intent not to be a father
and the contract in which he makes that intent known. Surrogacy contracts, which have gotten
considerably more media attention than sperm donation contracts, are also usually enforced.
The degree of regulation varies from state to state, but few states ban surrogacy contracts and

107
Ira Mark Ellman, “Contract Thinking” was Marvin’s Fatal Flaw, 76 N OTRE D AME L. R EV . 1365,
1373 (200 1) (people do not think of relationships like marriage in contract term s).
108

“[I]t [is] of contract that the relation shou ld be established.” Mayna rd, 125 U.S. at 211, quoting
Adam s v. Palm er, 51 Me . 481, 483 (186 3).
109

Id.

110

A marriage is voidable if a court determines that either party made a misrepresentation
con cerning the esse ntials of m arriag e an d thereby ind uce d co nse nt. I RA M ARK E LLMAN ET AL ., F AM ILY L AW :
C ASES , T EXTS , P R O B LE M S 118 (3d ed. 199 8).
111
Exact figures are impossible to generate because there is no registration or notification
requirement for sperm donation or, in many states, surrogacy arrangements.
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most states enforce them.112 With traditional surrogacy contracts, in which a woman enters a
contract with a man who provides the sperm which she then uses to impregnate herself, the law
honors the traditional surrogate’s intent not to be a mother, despite her genetic connection to the
child. The law finds the traditional surrogate’s intent in the surrogacy contract.113 When it
honors gestational surrogacy contracts, in which a surrogate mother gestates another woman’s
ova fertilized with another man’s egg, the law allows the gestational surrogate to sign away
whatever parental rights she might acquire by virtue of her gestational labor. It also allows the
contract to bestow parental rights on the male and female genetic contributors. It is the through
the contract, not the genetic contribution, that the “intended” parents acquire their parental rights.
Johnson v. Calvert,114 probably the most well known and important gestational surrogacy
case decided to date, makes this perfectly clear. In Johnson, after blood tests confirmed that the
egg donor was the genetic mother, the court was faced with conflicting presumptions of
motherhood under the California statute. The surrogate acquired parental status by virtue of “her
having given birth to the child;”115 the genetic mother acquired her parental status by virtue of the
blood test. The court found that “[b]ecause two women each have presented acceptable proof of
maternity, we do not believe this case can be decided without enquiring into the parties’

112

For a review of the re gulation of surroga cy laws , see http://ww w.kentlaw .edu /islt/
TA BLEIV.htm .
113

The primacy of the contract over the genetic contribution is evident in the courts’ treatment of
the m en in these situations. If surrogacy situations were really treated as instance s in which the sperm
donor im pregnated the surrogate th e “o ld-fashioned way” then a surrogate’s husband would, in alm ost all
states, be entitled to a presumption of paternity. As indicated sup ra, note 53, many courts use a Best
Inte rest o f the C hild sta ndard to adjud icate c om peting claim s to paternity w hen m ore than one m an enjoys
the presum ption of paternity as both m en wou ld in a traditional surrogacy con tract case (one by virtue of a
blood test; the other by being married to the mother). Yet even in In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J.
1988), a case which struck down surrogacy contracts, the New Jersey Supreme C ourt never thought
abo ut bestow ing pa renta l rights on M ary Be th W hitehe ad’s hus ban d.
114

115

851 P.2d 776 (C al. 1993) (en ba nc).
C AL . C IV . C O D E § 7003(1) (1993) (repealed 19 94).
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intentions as manifested in the surrogacy agreement.”116

In letting contract interpretation guide

their decision about parental rights, the Court relied on commentators who have emphasized the
reliance interest117 and the expectations118 created in the intending parents by the contract.
The Johnson court invoked a “but for” causation argument also, but the Court did not rule
that “but for” the Johnsons’ actions the child would not have been born. Instead the court wrote,
“[b]ut for their acted-on intention, the child would not exist.”119 Intent, not action, was at the
core of the decision. Thus the court held that when there are competing presumptions of
motherhood under the California act “she who intended to procreate the child -- that is, she who
intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own -- is the natural
mother.”120 The Johnson court was confident enough of its analysis to go on to declare that “in a
true ‘egg donation’ situation, where a woman gestates and gives birth to a child formed from the
egg of another woman with the intent to raise the child as her own, the birth mother is the natural
mother under California law.”121

Less than a year later, the Supreme Court of New York was

faced with the very case the Johnson court foresaw. Completely persuaded by Johnson’s
analysis, the New York court held that a gestational mother who had intended to raise the
children born from her as her own, was the natural mother even though she had no genetic

116

Joh nso n, 851 P.2d at 782.

117

See Joh n La wrence Hill, W hat Does It Mean to Be a “Parent”? The Claims of Biology as the
Basis for Parenta l Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. R EV . 353, 415 -16 (199 1) (“T he inte nde d pa rents rely, both
financially and emotionally, to their detriment on the promises of the biological progenitors and gestational
host.”)
118

Shu ltz, supra note 37, at 300-03. (“W hen []intentions are de liberate, explicit and barga ined for,
where they are the catalyst for reliance and expectations, as is the case in technologically -assisted
reproductive arrangem ents, they should be honored .”)
119

Joh nso n, 851 P.2d at 782 (em pha sis supp lied). A “but for their action” test could not have
resolved the dispute becau se “b ut for” the surrogate ’s action, the child would not have bee n bo rn eithe r.
120

Id. at 782.

121

Id. at 782, n.10.
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connection to the children.122
Courts in cases involving non-expert artificial insemination and usually involving no
written contract, also rely on intent to determine parenthood.123 In the absence of explicit
contract, courts find implicit ones. In C.M. v. C.C.,124 a New Jersey court found relevant and
determinative the known donor’s “consent and active participation” in the artificial insemination
and from that evinced an intent “to assume the responsibilities of parenthood.”125 The sperm
donor was thus declared the father. In Jhordan C. v. Mary K,126 although the Court explicitly
failed to reach the question of whether an oral or written nonpaternity agreement between the
parties would be binding,127 it nonetheless took particular care to note that the parties’ conduct
during the pregnancy and for three months after the birth did not evince an intent to exclude the
biological father.128 Hence the biological father was declared the father. In R.C. v. J.R,129 the
Colorado Supreme Court, after surveying most of the decided cases and reviewing most of the
legal commentary on the subject, held that the determinative question on whether the sperm
donor should receive parental status was whether “[the sperm donor and mother] at the time of

122

Mc Do nald v. Mc Do nald, 608 N.Y.S .2d 477 (A pp. D iv. 1994).
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See R.C. v. J.R., 775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989); Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 392
(Ct. App. 1986); C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 82 1 (N.J. 1977).
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377 A.2d 8 21 (N.J. Juv. & D om . Rel. Ct. 1977).
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Id. at 824-25.
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179 Cal. App. 3d 386 (C t. App . 1986).

127

Id. at 396.

128

Admittedly, this court operates from a presumption that the biological father should be the
father, but that presumption could be overcome by evidence that the parties’ intent was that he not be the
fathe r. Id.
129

775 P.2d 27 (C olo. 19 89).
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insemination agree that [the sperm donor] will be the natural father.”130
Courts are more split on the role of intent when the party claiming parenthood is not
biologically related to the child and did not carry the child to term. In Nancy S. v. Michele G.,131
a California court rejected the visitation claim of a woman who had, together with her partner,
decided to have and rear two children. The non-child bearing partner sued for parental rights
after the couple split. The partner was listed on each child’s birth certificate as the father, lived
with and helped raise the children for several years and shared custody of the children for a time
after the couple split.132 The court held that “[a]lthough the facts . . . [were] relatively
straightforward regarding the intent of the natural mother to create a parental relationship
between [the non-biological mother] and her children” using intent as a standard would be illadvised because it would depend too much on “elusive factual determinations.”133 In contrast, in
E.N.O. v. L.M.M. the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts relied extensively on a
coparenting agreement executed by a lesbian couple.134 So did a Pennsylvania court in J.A.L. v.

130

Id. at 35. In one case in which a court did not rely on preconception intent when it granted
paternal rights to a sperm donor, the court looked to the post-birth relationship that had developed
between the child and the sperm donor. Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1994). The
court looked to the functional agreement between the biological mother and the biological father which
indica ted m utua l intent to have the biologica l father ass um e a patern al role. T heir beha vior po st-birth
m odified or trum ped wha tever the c ourt m ay hav e be en a ble to glean abo ut pre -conce ption intent.
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279 Ca l. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 199 1).

132

Id. at 214.

133

Id. at 219.

134

711 N.E .2d 886 (M ass . 1999). In doing so, the court distinguished an earlier case
involving the claim of a functional father because there was no indication that the functional
father and them other had agreed that he should assume a parental role and he had not been
“intimately involved in the decision to bring the child into the world. Id. At 89 1, citing C .M. v. P .R.,
649 N.E .2d (M ass . 1995).
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E.P.H. ”135 Preconception intent is critical to courts’ allocations of parental rights.136 In Karin
T. v. Michael T.,137 the court held that a woman who had changed his identity to become a man
and participated in a marriage ceremony with a woman was responsible for the children born to
the marriage through artificial insemination. The parties had signed an agreement in which the
man agreed that the children were “his own legitimate . . . children.”138 The court held that “[t]he
contract and the equitable estoppel which prevail in this case prevent the respondent from
asserting her lack of responsibility by reason of lack of parenthood.”139
In her book, Defining the Family, Law Technology and Reproduction in an Uneasy Age,
Janet Dolgin argues that in relying on intent in reproductive technology cases, courts have not
been relying on contract.140 She theorizes that courts are wary of relying on contract in this area
because contract principles invoke the rules of the marketplace and courts resist applying those
rules to the family. 141 Had they been willing to rely on contract, she opines, they would have
simply looked to the documents and not struggled to discern intent. In short, she argues that the
opinions use a subjective not an objective theory of contract and thus cannot accurately be
135

682 A.2d 1314 (Pa. S uper 1996) (relying on a docum ent tha t recite d the biological m oth er’s
and her p artne rs’ joint decision to c onc eive and ra ise a c hild).
136

Also important is the distinction between visitation rights and a finding of paternity. Lesbian
and gay male partners often do not seek an adjudication of paternity or maternity. They seek custody or
visitation rights und er so m ething like a d e fac to parenth ood theory. See E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886
(Mass . 1999). Courts may be more comfortable granting custody rights as opposed to parental status to a
non-biologically related person, but it is not at all clear that there is an important substantive difference
betw een an award of c usto dy and a determ ination of pa renth ood . Legal cus tody give s on e the right to
m ake de cision s on beh alf of the ch ild. See E LLMAN ET AL ., supra note 110 at 613. Those decisions may
be challenged in court by another person with custody rights. The right to custody is best understood as
the righ t to parent, albeit with som e interferen ce from other parents .
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484 N .Y.S.2d 780 (Fam . Ct. 1985).
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Id. at 782.
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Id. at 19.
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described as relying on contract.142 Although Dolgin’s assessment of the courts’ discomfort with
these cases is certainly sound, she dismisses the importance of contract too readily. Contracting
for parental rights outside of the construct of marriage is a novel, difficult and weighty
proposition. There are, after all, very important third parties involved.
The idea that courts would use simple objective theories of contract interpretation when
children’s existence and ultimate care are at stake is rather simplistic. “Objective” interpretations
depend on context. “[S]ubjective intent . . . is relevant . . . insofar as it helps a court ascertain the
‘objective’ meaning of certain terms.”143 The meaning attached to words and actions is a
function of norms and conventions.144 Words and actions serve as manifestation of intent only
when there is a commonly understood convention that gives those words and actions meaning.
The sheer novelty of contracts in the reproductive technology area makes it likely that courts will
need to struggle with objective interpretation. There are no commonly understood conventions.
In addition, the courts’ and the parties’ lack of familiarity with the technology make it important
for courts to scrutinize the contracts particularly carefully. Finally, and possibly most important,
the parties to these contracts are contracting into and out of status that enjoys significant
constitutional protection.145 It is implausible and arguably inappropriate to think that at this
nascent stage of technological baby-making a court would enforce a surrogacy contract with the
facility and efficiency with which it enforces a contract for the sale of widgets. The norms
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Id. For more on the difference between objective and subjective theories of contract
interpretation see 1 E. A L L EN F ARNSW ORTH , F A R N S W O R T H O N C ONTRACTS § 3.6 (2d e d. 1998).
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Randy Barne tt, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 C O L U M . L. R EV . 269, 304 (1986).
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Id. at 303.
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The Su prem e Court’s prote ction o f parenta l rights has a long a nd vene rable history. See
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down law prohibiting the teaching of a foreign language
because it violated parents’ rights to educate their children as they wished); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (192 5) (striking down com pulsory public school attendance for the sam e reason ); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944) (reifying a parent’s right to “bring up [a] child in the way he
should go”); W isconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (striking down compulsory high school education
law beca use it violated paren t’s ability to raise their ch ildren in th e Am ish tradition).
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pursuant to which people act in this arena are still emerging and thus courts must be particularly
careful in assessing what words and actions will have what legal meaning. This does not mean
that courts are not using contract. It means they are using contract carefully.

C. De Facto and Equitable Fathers: Parenthood by Implicit Contract

The final class of cases in which courts rely on contract theory involve de facto and/or
equitable fathers. As mentioned earlier, a growing number of courts are holding non-biologically
related men responsible for the support of children for whom they have been functioning as
fathers.146 Courts also allow non-biologically related men who want to claim parental rights to
do so with regard to children for whom they have been functioning as father.147 In both cases,
the courts estop one party from claiming a lack of paternity based on biology alone. Various
different theories underlie these findings of estoppel, but they all involve notions of bargain or
reliance. That is, they all involve notions of contract.

Those courts using a theory of implied or

express bargain emphasize the consideration the putative father has received by acting as father.
Those courts using a theory of express148 or implied149 promise emphasize reliance.
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See Mo nm outh County v. R .K., 757 A.2d 3 19 (N.J. Supe r. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000); Marko v v.
Ma rko v, 758 A.2d 75 (Md. 2000); J.M. v. S.M., 750 N.E.2d 34 (M ass . App . Ct. 20 01).
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Tregoning v. W iltschek, 782 A.2d 1001 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (mother estopped from denying
pate rnal status of m an w ho h ad a cted as fa ther); In re Marriage of R oberts, 649 N .E.2d 1344, 1346 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1995) (biological mother estopped from denying husband’s paternity of the child when she
represented to him that he was th e fa the r an d, relying on that representa tion , he developed a re lationship
with the child.)
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See Nygard v. Nygard, 401 N.W .2d 323 (Mich. C t. App . 198 6) (m an a sked p regn ant w om an to
marry him k nowing that he was not the biological father of the children to be born and promising to raise
them as his own.)
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Markov, 758 A.2d at 81-83 (man’s eleven year contact with biologically unrelated children,
during which he continually insisted on treating and raising the children as his own, established reliance
sufficient to estop ma n from denying responsibility); Monm outh County , 757 A.2d at 327 (man who never
married mother but acted as “psychological parent” to biologically unrelated children estopped from
denying pate rnity).
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In Clevenger v. Clevenger, a California court ruled that an express oral agreement to
support the child was enough to hold a non-biologically related man responsible as father.150 In
Wade v. Wade, a Florida court looked to the man’s behavior, holding himself out as the father,
claiming the son as a dependent, signing the birth certificate, as well as “the benefits of his
representations as the child’s father, including the child’s love and affection, his status as father .
. . and the community’s recognition of him as the father” to find the putative father estopped
from denying paternity.151

In another case involving a man trying to repudiate his paternity, a

Pennsylvania court emphasized that “the dispositive issue should be whether the putative father
has indicated by his conduct that the child is his own.”152

Because he had so indicated, he was

estopped from denying his paternity.
Biological mothers can also be estopped from denying parental rights to men who have
acted as father. Under both the equitable parent and de facto parent doctrines, a growing number
of states recognize rights in non-biologically related men who have acted as fathers.153 The
courts recognize these rights at the request of the men. Quite obviously, if these men did not find
benefit in the parental relationship, they would not make claims for custody.
All of these cases involve courts finding that the benefits a man receives by functioning

150

11 Ca l. Rptr. 707 (Ct. App. 196 1). The court did not indicate whether a mistake of fact (that the
m an p resum ed, inc orrectly, that he was the biologica l father) would void the c ontra ct. See also Peitros v.
Peitros, 638 A.2d 545, 548 (R.I. 1994) (man liable for support based on his “voluntary and continuous
course of conduct as the child’s only father” and the fact that the mother’s choice to not terminate the
preg nan cy was a “d irect result of [the m an’s] ass uran ces that he wou ld ass um e the pare ntal role”).
151

W ade v. W ade, 536 S o. 2d 1158, 116 0 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).

152

Go nzalez v. Andrea s, 369 A.2d 416 , 418 (Pa. Sup er. Ct. 197 6).

153

In re Marriage of Gallagher, 539 N.W .2d 479 (Iowa 1995) (husband allowed to bring claim for
custody for 2 year old child he treated as his own); Bupp v. Bupp, 718 A.2d 1278 (Pa. Super Ct. 1998)
(mother’s ex-boyfriend who lived with child for a year and acted as father can bring action for custody
whe n co uple sep arate s); In re Marriage of Sleeper, 929 P.2d 1028 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (mother estopped
from den ying husba nd’s paternity even though b oth spou ses knew th e ch ild was not biologica lly related to
the husban d). T h e A L I P ri nc ip le s in c o rp orate both the equitable parent and the de facto doctrin es
into its pa ren tal righ ts se ction . See A M E R IC A N L AW INSTITUTE , P RINCIPLES OF THE L AW OF F AMILY
D I SS O L U T IO N : A N A L YS IS A N D R ECOMMEND ATIONS § 2.03(b)-(c) (2 002 ).
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as father confer rights and obligations that cannot be abandoned upon demand. The obligations
follow the benefits because his behavior constitutes “conduct that would lead a reasonable person
in the [mother’s] position to infer a promise in return for performance or promise. . . ”154

The

mother can count on his continued support because she allowed him to enjoy the benefits of
fatherhood. He can count on his continued ability to receive the benefits of fatherhood because
he met the obligations of fatherhood.
Recently, courts have focused more on reliance and less on the benefit the putative father
received. Sometimes courts talk about the reliance of the child;155 sometimes they talk about the
reliance of both the child and the mother.156 Often the courts are ambiguous about who relied157
and sometimes they talk only about the reliance of the mother.158 This confusion about who
must rely is understandable and ultimately unimportant. To separate a child’s reliance from that
of his acknowledged parent makes no sense. Unless one operates at the extremes of wealth, if a
parent is hurt financially -- as any parent would be if a source of support disappeared -- the child

154

1 F ARNSW ORTH , supra note 142 at 235.

155

In re Pate rnity of Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d 488 , 496 (Mass . 2001). (“Cheryl knew and relied on [the
m an w ho had b een sup porting he r] as h er father”); Mo nm outh County v. R .K., 757 A.2d 319, 331 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. D iv. 2000) (“[c hild] has been fin ancially reliant upon [man w ho had be en supp orting her]”;
Godin v. Godin, 725 A.2d 904, 911 (Vt. 1998) (man estopped from denying paternity because financial
and em otio nal welfare of the child who depended on m an for 14 years trum ped fa ct th at m an and child
were not biologically related.)
156

Nygard v. Nygard, 401 N .W .2d 323, 327 (M ich. Ct. App. 1986) (“T he circ um sta nces of this
case are such that the pro m ise m ust be enforced if injustice is to be avoided. Be cause of de fendant’s
promise an obligation arose both to plaintiff and to the child.” ); W right v. Newm an, 467 S.E.2d 533, 535
(Ga. 1996) (m an w ho fo r 10 years acted as fathe r to ch ild estoppe d from den ying paternity wh ere b oth
m other and child “relied upon [man ’s] promise to their detriment.”)
157

Monm outh County , 757 A.2d at 327 (“there was reasonable reliance”); C.C.A. v. J.M.A., 744
So.2d 515 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that father-child relationship of 2 years was sufficient amount
of tim e for cou rt to apply paternity-esto ppe l principle).
158

Markov, 758 A.2d at 83. (“it is incumbent upon Appellee . . . to prove sufficiently that her
reliance upon Ap pellant’s prior conduct and verbal representations has res ulted in a... loss.”); Perkins v.
Perkins, 383 A.2d 634, 636 (Conn. 1977) (man, who was “for all intents and purposes the father of the
child” for over 2 years, e sto pped from denying obligatio n to support ch ild where m oth er relie d on m an’s
com m itment).
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will be hurt also. The child is in no position to rely financially because the child does not make
financial decisions. To the extent that courts feel the need to find financial reliance,159 they
inevitably will look to reliance of the acknowledged parent (i.e., the mother), not just the child.
When they find that reliance, they estop the putative father from disclaiming his support. This
trend toward reliance suggests that courts are switching contract doctrines and relying more on
notions of promissory estoppel than mutual assent. The nature of the relationship and/or the
longevity of the period of support readily support findings that the mother “rel[ied] on the
promise” and the putative father “had reason to expect the reliance that occurred.”160
Whether they use theories of mutual assent or promissory estoppel, courts are looking to
the functional relationship between two adults to determine parenthood. By examining that
functional relationship they find intent and consideration and reliance.
Before leaving the discussion of parenthood by implicit contract, it is also worth noting
that, perhaps unwittingly, the Supreme Court’s doctrine of paternal rights is remarkably
consistent with a contract theory. The string of Supreme Court cases dealing with claims of
unwed fathers that starts with Stanley v. Illinois161 and ends with Michael H. v,. Gerald D.162
suggests that the most important factor in determining whether a genetic father will be entitled to
constitutional protection of his parental rights is his relationship with the mother. In Stanley and
Caban v. Mohammed,163 cases in which the court protected the father’s constitutional rights as a
parent, one could readily find an implicit agreement between the mother and father to share
parental rights. Peter Stanley had lived with the mother of his children intermittently for 18

159

Several courts have been reluctant to estop a man from repudiating paternity based only on the
em otio nal relia nce of the child. See Markov, 758 A.2d 75; K.B. v. D.B. & Another, 639 N.E.2d 725 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1994).
160

1 F ARNSW ORTH , supra note142 at 161-63.

161

405 U.S. 645 (1972)
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491 U.S . 110 (1989)
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441 U.S . 380 (1979)
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years. Mr. Caban had consistently visited and sometimes assumed custody of his children for
five years. In contrast, in Lehr v. Robertson164 and Quilloin v. Walcott165 the court denied both
biological fathers parental rights because neither had maintained a relationship with the mother
of the children. Justice Stewart’s dissent in Caban was quoted with approval by Justice Stevens
in Lehr. “Even if it be assumed that each married parent after divorce has some substantive due
process right to maintain his or her parental relationship, it by no means follows that each unwed
parent has any such right. Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological
connection between parent and child. They require relationships more enduring.”166

Justice

Stewart’s reference to marital status makes clear that the enduring relationships from which
paternal rights grow are relationships with the mother not just the child.167 When the
relationship with the mother is strong enough, and more particularly when the mother manifests
her intent and desire for the biological father to assume the role of father, the biological father
receives constitutional protection for his paternal rights.168 If the mother has not entered into a
relationship with the biological father with regard to parenting the child or if she has clearly
committed to parenting with someone else,169 biology alone will not grant fathers constitutional

164

463 U.S . 248 (1983)

165

434 U.S . 246 (1978)

166

Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260, quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 397 (emphasis added, citations and italics

omitted)
167

The situation in Lehr is all the more significant because the uncontested facts revealed that
the mother actively prevented the biological father from developing such a relationship. She did not agree
to him being the father of the child, and because of the greater control she had over the child at birth, her
des ires trum ped . Lehr, 463 U.S . at 268-69.
168

For furthe r exp lication o f this the ory, see Ja net D olgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions
About Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. R EV . 637 (1 993) (arguing that the m ore the biological fa the r an d m oth er’s
relationship resembles the stereotypical nuclear family, the more likely the Court is to acknowledge
pate rnal righ ts).
169

See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U .S. 110 (1989). (Th e m othe r in that c ase was m arried to
som eone other than the biological fa the r. T he court held that th e biological connectio n plus a re lationship
with the child was no t enough to sec ure cons titutional protection for the biological father.)
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protection.

D. Parenthood as Lived: Contracts in Practice

The law’s comfort in letting contact, not biology, confer parental status may be partially
explained by parents’ willingness to let contract determine parental status. Agreement or
patterned behavior between biological mothers and fathers is the most important predictor of
paternal support. Marital status is more important than race, education, age, and family size in
predicting the likelihood of a child support award.170 In one of the most comprehensive studies
of child support in this country, Andrew Beller and John Graham found that only 15% of nevermarried mothers received child support awards.171 Close to half (43%) of never-married mothers
who did not receive an award said they did not want one, which suggests that mothers themselves
do not see biology as the lynchpin of male responsibility. 172
The great majority of women who do want a child support payment, and therefore sue for
paternity, pursue men with whom they have had a relationship of some duration. Two-thirds of
paternity suits involve women suing men who were present at the birth of the child.173 Over 80%

170

171

A NDREA B E L LE R & J O H N G RAHAM , S MALL C H A N G E : T HE E CONOM ICS

OF

C H IL D S U P P O R T 89 (1993).

Id. at 20.

172
This suggests that the recent improvem ents in DNA m atching have had and will have minimal
impac t on the likelihoo d of w om en filing for pa ternity. In 19 86 , on ly 3 % of m ot he rs w ith ou t a c hild
su pp or t aw ar d c ite d a n in ab ility to es ta blis h p at er nit y a s a rea so n th at w er e n ot rec eiv ing ch ild
su pp ort Beller and Graham, supra note 170 at 21. A com parably large (42%) perce ntage of everdivorc ed m othe rs said the y did not wan t an award. Id. Many of the ever-divorced women had remarried
and thus had an alternative source of s upp ort, but that sim ply underscores the co nclusion that a
substan tial percenta ge of b oth never-m arried and divorced do not s ee biology as the lynchpin of m ale
respon sibility.
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Esther W attenberg, Paternity Actions and Young Fathers, in Y O U N G U N W E D F A T H ER S :
C H A N G IN G R O L E S A N D E M E R G I N G P OLICIES 213, 226 (R oberta I. Lerma n & T heodora J. Oom s eds., 1993).

42

Bargaining or Biology?
of unwed fathers help mothers with pregnancy either emotionally or financially. 174 At the time of
the child’s birth, 82% of unwed parents are romantically involved, and 51% live together.175
Approximately 85% of unmarried fathers continue their relationship with the mother through the
pregnancy and for an average of two to three years into the child’s life.176 Thus, the vast
majority of women who get child support from unmarried fathers have claims rooted in
relationship as well as blood.
The most important factor in predicting continued contact between a separated father and
his children is the father’s relationship with the children’s mother.177 Significantly, his
relationship with the mother is more important than the extent of his involvement with the
children prior to separation.178 Interviews also suggest that men’s subjective sense of
responsibility toward their children is linked more to their feelings toward the mother than their
feelings toward their children.179 One of the most transparent manifestations of this phenomenon
is men’s tendency to support and nurture the children with whom they live more than children to
whom they are biologically related.180 Fathers who, for whatever reason, can no longer
cooperate with a former partner, often find a new one. It is the children of that new partner whom
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Mc Lan aha n et al., supra note 88, at 11.

175

Id. at 3.

176

Victoria W illiams & Ro bert W illiam s, Identifying Daddy: The Role of the Courts in Establishing
Paternity in 28 J UDGES ’ J. 2, 5 (1989 ).
177

D O W D , supra note 50 at 3. Initial reports from the Fragile Families Project at Princeton
University indicates that while in a relationship with the father, unwed mothers are more supportive of
fathers’ rights than are w ed m others. Onc e the rom antic relationship has ended, how ever, they are
sub stan tially less likely to be sup portive of his rights. Lin & M cLa nah an, supra note 84 at 16.
178

Dowd, s upra note 50, at 3.
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W IL LIA M M AR SIG LIO , P ROCREATIVE M AN 95 (1998) (citing F RANK F U R S T EN B E R G
CH ER LIN , D IV ID E D F AMILIES : W HAT H A P P E N S TO C H IL D R E N W H E N P ARENTS P ART (199 1)).
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Nancy D owd elabo rates on this proces s of “serial” pare nting. See D O W D , supra note 50, at 26-

31, 204.
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they support both financially and emotionally. 181 Thus, when the parenting agreement with the
first woman breaks down, they make a new agreement with a new woman and they support that
new woman’s children.
There are also significant groups of people, particularly low income people, for whom
parenting apart has become the norm.182 In these groups, researchers have found that parental
status is “negotiated.”183 Frank Furstenberg argues that mothers and children in the inner city
don’t think of their biological fathers as their fathers unless those men have “done for” the
children, both financially and emotionally.

Often, the man who “does for” the child is not the

biological father. The person who emerges as the father is the one whom the mother has allowed
to “do for” the child.
Judges are also aware of the importance of the mother-father relationship. Despite
Congress’ attempt to eliminate the distinction between marital and non-marital children, judges
award substantially more child support to women who were married to the father than to women
who were not. After correcting for education, age, race, region and the number and ages of
children, Beller and Graham still found an average award of $786 less for unmarried women.184
The unmarried biological father’s likely lower income level may account for much of this
unexplained differential, but Beller and Graham estimate that at most it could account for 73% of
the differential.185 In other words, unmarried women get less child support simply because they
are not married. This suggests that the judges awarding the support view the marital agreement as
a critical part of determining the extent of the biological father’s responsibility.

181

Id.

182

Id. at 119.

183

“Ne gotiate d” is F rank Fursten berg ’s term . See Frank Fursten berg , Fathering in the Inner City:
Pa ternal Participation and Public Policy, in F A T H E R H O O D : C ON TEM PO RA RY T H E O R Y, R E S E AR C H A N D S OCIAL
P O L IC Y 119, 131 (W illiam M arsiglio ed., 1995).
184
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B E L LE R & G RAHAM , supra note 170 at 111.
Id.
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In sum, as a matter of subjective expectation between the parties, as a matter of how
children actually experience who their parents are, and as a matter of how judges award child
support, implicit or explicit private agreements between adults play a critical role in determining
the extent of paternal responsibility. This is not to say that private agreement or contract
explains all allocations of parental status. The increased paternal identification requirements
passed as part of the 1996 Welfare Reform Act186 unabashedly adopt blood over contract as the
sin quo non of parenthood. By most accounts, these measures have increased the amount of
child support paid by men.187 Moreover, as discussed in Section I, some courts refuse to honor
the intent of the biological parents particularly if the intent was to relieve the biological father of
obligation.188 My argument is not that contract or intent always governs, but that contract
governs much more than the letter of paternity law would suggest.

III. The Contract

The last section examined how law and real life already let principles from contract
determine parental status. It was, for the most part, descriptive. This section moves into the
normative in order to explore and justify in more detail the nature of the contractual relationship.

186

Personal Responsibility and W ork Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (“PRW ORA”), Pub. L.
No . 104-193 , 110 Stat. 2105 (199 6) (codified in sca ttered sec tions o f 42 U .S.C .)
187

It is still not clear that the amount of support collected exceeds the enforcement costs,
how ever. Les lie Harris, Reconsidering the Criteria for Legal Fatherhood, 1996 UT A H L. R EV . 461, 476.
No r is it at all clear th at m aking this m en involved in their biologica l children ’s lives is good for the childre n.
Unwed m others who are not romantically involved with the biological father have substantially higher
opposition to fathers’ involvement than do either unwed mothers who are romantically involved with the
fathe r or ever-m arried m othe rs. Lin & Mc Lan aha n, supra note 92 at 16. Studies indicate that the cost on
the child of friction between unmarried parents may be greater than the benefit gained from increased
resourc es s upp lied by the non -custod ial pare nt. See Mc Lan aha n et al., supra note 88.
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See Bud nick v. Silverm an, 805 S o. 2d 111 2 (Fla. Dist. C t. App . 2002); In re A.B., 444 N.W .2d
415 (W is. Ct. App. 1989 ).
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The first part of this section looks at contract formation and examines how a parental status
contract can be made under a reliance theory, a will theory, a bargain theory or a relational theory
of contract. The second and third parts of this section look more closely at the terms of the
contract. Part two analyzes the entitlement that is bargained for and part three analyzes the scope
of the contractual obligation incurred. The rules explored in the latter parts of this Section are
presented in the spirit of an offer, examples of the ways in which a contract regime might
operate. I do not mean to suggest that the rules presented here are absolute or essential. I invite
counter-offers.

A. Contract Theory
There are many theories of contract and it may well be impossible to explain all
contractual relations with one model.189 Without going into any one theory in too much detail,
this part will sketch how reliance and will theory, bargain theory and relational contract theory all
support the idea that parental status can arise from implicit or explicit agreements to share
parental rights and obligations.190
1. Reliance and Will Theory
Reliance and will theory, both stalwarts of contract interpretation, are party-based theories
of contract formation. The primary concern of both theories centers on the contracting parties;
reliance theories protect the promisee, while will theories protect the promisor.191 Either theory
can explain why the law should enforce a parental status contract. It is easy to justify parental
contracts under a reliance theory because in most cases it is easy to find reliance on the part of
the mother and/or child. The only question is whether the reliance is reasonable. A mother’s
189

Patrick A tiyah, Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations, 94 L.Q. R EV . 193, 195 (1978).

190

Th is section will not discuss effic iency th eory be cause it is particularly un like ly that one would
see economic efficiency as the goal of family law. “Efficiency notions . . . cannot completely explain why
certain com m itments sh ould be enforce d unless it is . . . shown that econom ic efficiency is the exclusive
goa l of a legal order.” Barne tt, supra note 143.
191

See id. at 271-72.
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reliance on a man’s explicit promise “to treat the baby as his own”192 hardly seems unreasonable,
particularly in light of a long history of letting the connection between husband and wife
determine the parenthood of the child.193 Relying on an implicit promise to support, though
potentially more ambiguous, is unlikely to be unreasonable also. The implicit promise will only
be found when the relationship between the promisor and the mother is obvious and
interdependent enough for the law to assume a promise. By the same token, the longer and more
enmeshed the relationship, the more likely that reliance on the relationship is reasonable. Thus, if
one can find the implicit promise one can probably find reasonable reliance.
Will theories are concerned with the promisor.194 In particular, will theories surmise that a
contract has not formed unless the terms of that contract reflect the will of the promisor. Will
theory suffers from the subjective/objective problem discussed earlier.195 If the promisor’s
subjective will contradicts an objective interpretation of her words or actions, will theory
founders in its struggle to give words meaning.

As a result, will theories inevitably bend to

other interests, like reliance or fairness.196 Nonetheless, will theory cannot be dismissed entirely
because it gives moral force to why a promisor must be held to his promises. Holding a
promisor accountable honors the promisor’s autonomy which she exercises in the contract by
manifesting her will. Thus, the question from will theory in the parental contract context is
whether imposing parental status on a provider because of what he explicitly or implicitly
agreed to do respects his autonomy.

192

Nygard v. Nygard 401 N.W .2d 323, 325 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); See also Karin T. v. Michae l T.,
484 N .Y.S.2d 780 (Fam . Ct. 1985).
193

See su pra Section IIA .
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Am ong the m ore im porta nt cham pions of w ill theory are Mo rris R. Cohen , The Basis of
Contract, 46 H A R V . L. R EV . 553 (193 3), an d Charles Fried, C ONTRACT AS P ROMISE : A T H E O R Y O F
C ONTRACTU AL O B L IG A T IO N (198 1).
195

See su pra note 143-145.
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Barnett, supra note 143 at 273-75.
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One’s response to this query probably depends on how one views the interdependency of
family groups. If one sees all parties in a family as basically independent beings, as some have
argued the law increasingly construes them,197 then respecting autonomy might mean not binding
a man who has become a part of a family unit precisely because he is, at core, independent. He
should be viewed by the parties and the law as an autonomous individual, free to exercise his
own will at any time.

He should, for instance, be able to say “I intended to have a relationship

with the mother, but not the child(ren).” The law need not presume any other intention. On the
other hand, if one sees family units, even nontraditional family units, as essentially
interdependent, then a man’s claim that his autonomy interest trumps the needs of the
interdependency seems remarkably feeble. Unless a man explicitly claims “I intend to have a
relationship with you [the mother], but not your child(ren),” it may make more sense to assume
that he is willingly undertaking responsibility for the children because he is willingly interjecting
himself into an obviously interdependent unit. The forseeability of the harm caused to everyone
by his withdrawal from the unit will be transparent.198

By becoming part of a family unit, a

man (or woman) forseeably chooses to subordinate his autonomy interest.199 Under a will theory,
one can hold a man responsible as a father if he has acted like a father because it is simply
unreasonable for him to proclaim that his subjective intent was to be a “father-for-a-time,” with
that time ending whenever he walks away. Family members form bonds and create dependencies

197

See Do lgin, supra note 168.

198

A sports analogy com es to m ind. A P oint Guard on a baske tball team cannot c laim that sh e is
responsible only to the Center for damages incurred when she left the team. Even if the only person the
Point Guard intended to have a relationship with was the Center, the obvious forseeability of the damage
that her departure wou ld cause to the rest of the team should m ake he r responsible to the other players
as w ell. For a discuss ion of wha t courts ge nera lly do whe n pa rties to a con tract fa il to include term s to
cover forseeable problems, see 2 F ARNSW ORTH , supra note 142, at 327-38.
199

The recent ALI principles suggest that the same kind of thinking should govern the law of
cohabitation. Unless the cohabiters specifically contract out of the law or marital dissolution, the law of
m arital diss olution sho uld go vern their break -up. See ALI, supra note 153 at § 6.02 cmt. a, 915.
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that must be met on an on-going basis.200

2. Bargain Theory
The bargain theory of consideration, probably the best known and widely used theory of
contract, posits that a contract is a contract and not an unenforceable agreement when
consideration is bargained for and passes from both sides. Bargain theory focuses less on the
parties and more on the process of contract formation. To find a bargain contract in the parental
status context one needs to find bilateral consideration passing from both sides. This is not hard.
The mother offers to let her partner share in the parenting of her child/ren. The father accepts by
participating, financially and emotionally.

The mother relinquishes some of her parental rights

in order to receive emotional and financial support. The father incurs obligations for financial
support in order to participate emotionally in the life of the family. He gains the benefits of
parenthood. She loses control that she would otherwise have to steer the upbringing of the
child.201 The father figure cannot be heard to say that there are no benefits because all of the
petitions for rights and visitation made by non-biologically- related functional parents attest to
the fact that functional fathers receive consideration.202 Thus, there is bilateral consideration and
there is a contract.

3. Relational Contract Theory

Relational contract theory looks to relationships between parties to find the existence and

200

Thoug h they may not h ave to form perm ane nt bonds . See infra text accompanying notes 258-

261 .
201

For more on what these rights involve, see infra text accompanying notes 224-227. The
reason why parental rights are vested in the mother in the first instance is explored infra in Section IIIB .
202

See equitable parent cases discussed supra text acco m pan ying notes 153.
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terms of a contract.203 Ian Macneil suggests that whenever an on-going relationship between the
parties is likely to be more important than a discrete transaction or communication between the
parties, the law should look to the relationship itself rather than to specific terms or the lack
thereof.

As Charles Goetz and Robert Scott put it, “[a] contract is relational to the extent that

the parties are incapable of reducing important terms of the arrangement to well-defined
obligations.”204 With relational contracts, the “existence of formal communication does not
automatically trigger the application of [] neoclassical” contract interpretation.205 “Rather the
preliminary question must always be asked: do the formal communications indeed reflect the
sharp past focus and strong intentions necessary to put these communications high in the priorites
of values created by the contractual relationship.”206 If the written agreement looks quite
obviously different than the lived relationship then the written agreement will have limited
importance. In such a case one would look to the relationship itself to find terms.
The recent Family Law ALI guidelines for custody suggest a comparable approach to
determining the terms of a post-divorce custody award. Instead of relying on abstract concepts
like joint custody, best interest of the child, or tender years presumptions, the ALI argues that
courts should use the past relationship to determine future rights and obligations.207 In many
ways, the ALI rules adopt suggestions made by Robert and Elizabeth Scott in a piece that

203

Relational contract theory dispenses with much of the theoretical purity and formality of the
previously address ed theories. Instea d of loo kin g to what is explicitly presented , or in Ian M acneil’s
phrase, “presentiated,” in a formal contract, relational contract theory examines how people act and what
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explored the benefits of viewing marriage as a relational contract.208 Among other suggestions in
that piece, the Scotts argue that relational contract theory can help determine optimal custody and
support rules for divorce. I am arguing that relational contract theory is just as good at helping
courts determine custody and support issues even if the parties were never married and even if
they are not biologically related to the children. In other words, relational contract theory is just
as good at determining parental status as it is at determining custody rights. The relationships of
unmarried parents or married people whose children are not necessarily their biological issue do
not differ in material ways from the relationships of married people whose children are their
biological issue. The interdependency and exchange and reliance are often identical. Once one
acknowledges that legally enforceable rights and obligations can come from the relationship
itself, not only from some formal legal agreement, then it is not hard to find parental rights and
obligations bestowed by virtue of the relationship. Once one finds parental rights and obligations
bestowed by virtue of relationship, one finds parental rights and obligations bestowed by virtue
of implied contract. If parental rights and obligations are bestowed by virtue of contract, parental
status is bestowed by virtue of contract.
The next part explores the terms of the contract in more detail. My claim is that contract
theory and doctrine provide a superior framework for determining parental status than does the
current regime. My claim is not that all agreements to parent are obviously legally enforceable
contracts. The relationship between mother and father, at least if it is significant enough to give
rise to parental status, is likely to be complex and messy and subjective; it is not likely to
conform to the classical model of contract.209 However, as most contract scholars agree, there
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Elizabeth Scott & Ro bert S cott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA . L. R EV . 1225, 1306
(1998) (“[T]he substantive legal rules defining the conditions for divorce, alimony, spousal support, and, to
a lesser extent, child custody, are usefully analyzed as contract default rules.”)
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are precious few arrangements, commercial or otherwise, that conform to the classical model of
contract.210 “All contracts are relational, complex and subjective.”211 The debate between current
contract scholars is not about whether contracts are discrete willful acts with defined objective
terms (almost none of them are), but about the role contract law should play in adjudicating
contractual disputes involving complicated relationships, modified terms and irrational
behavior.212

There are those who want to expand contract law to better incorporate all of the

bargaining relationships that do not conform to the classical model.213 There are others who
suggest that we are better off restricting judges to their traditional role as formalistic interpreters
of objective terms because judges are quite incapable of incorporating adequately or fairly the
variety of norms and subjective understandings that permeate most contractual relationships.214
The model offered here is consistent with either an expansive or a restricted understanding of
contract interpretation. The rules we choose to apply to agreements between people who act like
parents may be a function solely of private agreement, of public policy or of some
combination.215 An expansionist might look to a vast array of norms, relationships and policy
concerns to interpret the contract between mother and father. A formalist might make all
necessary policy determinations ex ante and impose legislatively mandated boiler plate for many
210

Id. at 805-08.
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Robert S cott, The Case of Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 N W . U. L. R EV . 847, 852
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Se e generally Sco tt, supra note 211 . S cott argues that if w e are w orri ed about the
opportunistic behavior in a formalist regim e, legislatively mand ated boilerplate can protect
ine xp erien ce d p arties to th e c on tract. Id. at 8 7. Eric Posner would probably also be an example of
someone who would favor a minimal role for judges in contract interpretation. See Eric A . Pos ner, A
Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error, 94 N W . U. L. R EV . 749 (200 0).
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or most parental status contracts.216 Whichever rules we choose to apply, contract doctrine can
be used “as a structure of argument.”217

B. The Entitlement at Issue
Before one can accept the idea that parental obligations can arise from contract one must
accept the idea that parental status can be appropriately conceptualized as property, or at least an
amalgam of alienable rights and obligations. As many have noted, there is an intrinsic
relationship between contracts and property.218 Contracts are vehicles for transferring property.
In Randy Barnett’s formulation, a contract is a “manifestation of an intention to alienate
rights.”219

I have elsewhere explained some of the benefits of using property paradigms in the
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Scott gives the example of the disclaimer of warranty language required by the UCC as an
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family law area.220 Among other things, property paradigms help courts resolve competing
claims to child custody in a manner that maintains family autonomy and rewards those adults
who have sacrificed for and invested in the child.221 Nonetheless, there is a strong resistance to
property rhetoric when it comes to characterizing family relationships, particularly relationships
with children.222 It may be more palatable to think of an agreement between parents not as a
contract for property but as a “manifestation of an intention to alienate rights.”223 Whatever
formulation one chooses, if one acknowledges that courts are currently using notions of contract
to guide their decisions as to parental status, then one acknowledges that courts are currently
using notions of property to determine parental status. Therefore it is important for us to analyze
the nature of the property at issue. What is it that is transferred between adults that allows courts
to reach conclusions as to parental status?
1. The Origins of the Entitlement
The property at issue in the parental contract is the entitlement to parental status. Parental
status brings with it parental rights. For some, parental rights include the rights to discipline and
educate, and the rights to choose medical treatment, religious traditions, geographical location
and social contacts for their children.224 For others, in particular those parents who are not
married to the other parent of a child, parental rights are more limited. They are more limited
because in cases of conflict between two never married or divorced parents, it is a court that
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G EO . L. J. 2303, 2350 (1984); Barbara W oodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on
Parents ’ Rights, 14 C A R D O Z O L. R EV . 1747, 1811-1 4 (19 93).
223

Barn ett, supra note 143 at 304.

224

See Katharine T . Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal
Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA . L. R EV . 879, 884-85 (198 4).

54

Bargaining or Biology?
decides what is in the child’s best interest.225 Nonetheless, in those cases, parental status at least
brings with it the procedural right to challenge the ways in which a child is being reared.
Parental status also brings with it a presumptive right to spend time with the child. Even if one
does not have legal custody, all states have a heavy presumption in support of parental
visitation.226 It is that visitation that many non-biological parents fight for when biological
parents want to keep them at bay.227
Parental status also brings with it obligations, most obviously the duty to support the
child. At present, as described earlier, the degree of one’s obligation is not tied to the strength of
one’s entitlement to a relationship with the child. One’s obligation is a simple function of one’s
income, a raw percentage, and that attaches absolutely and regardless of one’s relationship with
the child.
The contractual model offered here suggests that when adults contract for parental status
they contract to either alienate or acquire parental status vis a vis a child. Parents who alienate
their parental rights are agreeing to share those rights with someone else. They are agreeing to
co-parent. They are agreeing to give someone else the procedural right to challenge the way in
which the child is being reared and to give that person a right to petition for visitation. The coparents who receive these rights are agreeing to accept the rights and responsibilities (i.e., the
duty to support) of parenthood. They accept the contract because, for whatever reason, they want
to act as a parent to a child.
There still is a question of initial entitlement though. One can only agree to contract
away property that one has. Where do the rights come from for those parents who have not
gotten them through exchange with another parent? One might think the answer to that question
is the genetic material that one’s body produces. Hence, men could sell sperm and women could
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sell eggs and in doing so they would alienate not only their genetic material but the parental
status that might accompany that genetic material. If this were the case though, genetic
connection per se would give one parental status as long as one had not contracted that status
away. As we saw, such is not the case either constitutionally or as a matter of common law.
Men who are genetically connected to a child do not necessarily enjoy the rights (or the
obligations) of parenthood if someone else is filling the parental role.228
Instead, the property interest appears to emanate with the mother. De facto if not de jure,
it is the gestational mother who controls whether a biological father, or any other person, is able
to establish a relationship with the child and thereby secure parental rights.229 As a preliminary
matter, it is the pregnant woman and only the pregnant woman who decides whether to remain
pregnant. Once that decision is made, the pregnant woman can, with remarkable ease, prevent a
biological father from ever knowing about a child’s existence. For biological parents who are
not living together, it is the woman who decides whether the biological father knows about the
pregnancy, how participatory the biological father (or any other potential “father”) can be during
the pregnancy and, at least when the child is young, how much contact the father can have.230
She can thereby all but ensure that his parental rights will never be exercised. She can also take
measures to make it very likely that parental status will be vested in someone else. She can do
that by marrying someone else, by letting someone else adopt the child or by simply sharing her
life with someone else. As numerous researchers have found, women have always determined
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the extent of paternal involvement with children.231 From conception on, de facto parental status
is something that the woman has and can, at her discretion, mete out to someone else.232
Although courts have never put it in these terms,233 the above suggests that the gestational
mother gains parental status through her gestational investment, not through her genetic
contribution. A father gains parental status through his relationship with the mother. If the
gestational mother has not contracted her labor out (in a gestational surrogacy contract)234 or
previously agreed (through marriage or another form of contract)235 to share parental rights, then
she has exclusive control. Once she agrees, either explicitly or implicitly, to share that control,
she has a co-parent.
To some this paradigm may seem highly unfair. The woman, by virtue of labor that a man
cannot give, has more access to parenthood does a man. Yet the very same factors that make it
unfair to hold an unwilling man liable for a child that he never wanted, make it appropriate to
vest the gestational mother with sole parental status. It is her decision to undergo the huge and
very costly burdens of pregnancy.236 Up until birth, the mother has, of necessity, invested far
231
Jane Mosely & Elizabe th Thom son , Fathering Behavior and Child Outcomes: The Role of
Race and Poverty, in F A T H E R H O O D : C ON TEM PO RA RY T H E O R Y, R E S E AR C H A N D S OCIAL P OLIC Y 148 (W illiam
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121 (“[M]others are the ga tekeepe rs or facilitators to men ’s relationships with children.”)
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more of herself than has the biological father. Conscientious men may try to invest time and
money in the pregnancy, but the decision as to whether to accept that effort is the mother’s. At a
very basic level, there is simply no comparison between what a mother necessarily gives during
pregnancy and what a man can give. Thus, by virtue of her sole responsibility and labor, the
mother obtains sole parental rights. It follows, then, that she should shoulder all the obligation.
What this paradigm suggests, quite logically, is that all pregnant women should be treated
alike. A woman who gets pregnant the old fashioned way should be treated just as a woman who
gets pregnant by virtue of artificial insemination. If there is a pre-existing marriage or contract
suggesting that the pregnant woman intends to share her rights and responsibilities, the law
should honor that contract and vest parental status in a co-parent. If there is no such contract, the
woman is on her own.237
2. Limitations on the Contract
To a certain extent, the degree to which a mother shares the rights and responsibilities
that she acquires by virtue of gestation is up to her, but the number of people she can contract
with and the extent to which she can completely alienate her parental status must be limited.
Scholars disagree about the relative harms and benefits of multiple parental figures in a child’s
life,238 but most can probably agree that there should be some limit on the number of legal
“parents” a child should have. The more adults that have standing to assert visitation rights and
challenge the parenting decisions of others, the greater the likelihood of litigation. As almost all
family law commentators have recognized, judges are remarkably ill-prepared and institutionally

For m ore o n the physical cost of p regn anc y, see M cD ono ugh , supra note 80 at 1073-74.
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ill-suited to make sound parenting decisions.239 The more people there are with parental rights
vis a vis the same child, the greater the likelihood that a judge will be deciding what is in that
child’s best interest.

The extraordinary pecuniary and emotional toll this can take on a child

suggests that, for the child’s sake, the law should limit the number of contracts a mother can
make with regard to any one child.240
On the other hand, if a father abandons a mother and child, the mother should be able to
contract with someone else. By abandoning, the first father loses his right to be a parent and
frees the mother up to contract with someone else. If she contracts with someone else that new
person becomes the father, with his own parental rights and obligations. The first father stays
obligated until the mother contracts with someone else. Once she does, the first father loses
rights and obligations. This is what currently happens in the adoption context 241
The law should also limit the extent to which the mother can alienate her rights. The
bonding and reliance that give rise to the equitable and de facto parenthood doctrines242 suggest
that a parent should not be able to alienate her rights and responsibilities completely. That is, she
should not be able to sell her child. Children form bonds. In order to protect those bonds, the
law must forbid the complete alienation of a parent’s parental rights. If a parent abdicates her
rights by abandoning the child, the law cannot necessarily stop her or him, but the law can forbid
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a parent from getting paid to effect such an abandonment.243
3. Abandonment and Contractual Rights
Unfortunately, parenting studies suggest that abandonment by fathers is common. Forty
to sixty percent of children do not live with their fathers.244 Only sixteen percent of children in
fatherless households see their father at least once a week.245 Forty percent of children who live
in fatherless households have not seen their fathers at all in the past year.246 The chances of a
child not having seen his or her father increase with time. One study found that ten years after
divorce, nearly two-thirds of the children of those divorces have not seen their father at all in the
past year.247 Abandonment by mothers is not unheard of, but noncustodial mothers are much
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more likely than noncustodial fathers to visit their children.248 In other words, women abandon
but with far less frequency.
The prevalence of abandonment by fathers suggests that a legal label of father does not
keep men sufficiently connected to their children to ensure that child support gets paid or that
contact gets maintained.

Thus, it is not clear we would have any fewer involved and paying

fathers if the law acknowledged that abandonment and deprived abandoning fathers of their legal
status as parents. Abandonment would also not relieve a parent of parental status unless the
other parent contracted with someone new. A parent stays liable for the terms of the contract
unless the other parent has mitigated the damages caused by the disintegration of the first
agreement by finding another parent who explicitly or implicitly agrees to assume parental
status.249 The proposed regime thus gives no added incentive for fathers to abandon children.
The greater concern is probably the incentive effect on potential new fathers. Will
subsequent men form a relationship with a mother if they know that they could become legally
responsible for her children? It is this very concern that makes some judges wary of holding
step-parents responsible for child support.250 There are several responses. First, the elasticity of
men’s preference curves may not be as great as the concern suggests. If someone wants to share
his life with a woman and her family, the factors urging him to do so may well overwhelm
misgivings he has about future liability. This is particularly likely to be true if one assumes that
the pool of women with whom he might share his life is heavily populated by women with
children. Second, the extent to which many men already serial parent suggests that men are not
averse to taking on new responsibility. They are averse to having contact with their ex-partners.
Most divorced and separated men have children in their lives, even if those children are not their
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biological issue.251 The proposal offered here would make these men’s decision-making process
with regard to children a little clearer. If they are going to have children in their lives, they must
either continue their contact with an ex-spouse/partner or incur the risk of new liability with
another mother. Third, if on the one hand people are concerned that men won’t become
involved with children that are not their biological issue because those men will be worried about
future liability, and the other hand people are concerned about the extent to which men already
abandon their biological issue, we need to rethink current presumptions regarding men’s
entitlement to parent. If, because they could avoid child support, most men would avoid having
children in their lives, it tells us something remarkably disturbing about the likelihood that men
will be responsible parents. If we cannot count on men to be responsible parents, it is not clear
why we should be concerned about granting them parental rights at all.
By honoring contracts to share parental rights, the law honors the emotional and financial
bonds that develop between children and adults. Particularly if the number of parents stays
limited, there is every reason to believe that children will benefit from a contract to share parental
rights. The financial and emotional burdens of single parenthood, though not insurmountable,
are significant.252 By finding someone with whom to share those burdens, a mother helps ensure
that a child has both the emotional and financial support that he or she needs. Currently, the law
often assigns a second parent on the basis of biology. Empirical research and common sense
suggest that biology alone is a significantly inferior proxy of willingness to support than is an
agreement with the mother. An agreement with the mother is volitional action or words with
regard to parenting, not action with regard to sexual behavior. It is a decision by two adults to
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share parenting.253 Far more deliberation and concern is likely to go into a decision as to
whether to share one’s life with a woman and her child then is likely to go into a decision as to
whether to have sex.
In sum, the entitlement at issue in parenting contracts is the entitlement to parental rights
and responsibilities. As an initial matter, unless she has already agreed to share part of that
entitlement, the mother has an exclusive right to that entitlement. If she has agreed to share it,
the person with whom she has so agreed is the other parent. If she has not previously agreed to
share, she is the sole parent unless and until she contracts with someone else. The terms of her
contract must be limited, however. She cannot alienate her rights completely. She must always
remain a parent and she can only contract with multiple people if a former contracting partner has
abandoned the contract.254 If a former contracting partner has abandoned,255 a new person may
assume the previous partner’s status by contracting with the mother.

C. The Obligation at Issue
The previous parts explained how and why the law of contract can determine parental
status. This part explains how the law of contact can also help determine the extent of parental
obligation. The contract regime like the one offered here can help reorient the law’s approach to
how much child support a parent owes. As discussed above, federal legislation currently requires
that all states establish numerical criteria and guidelines that determine child support obligations
based on a raw percentage of income. The extent of the noncustodial parent’s previous
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Of course, not all biological parents are adults. The contract model suggests that the law
might apply special scrutiny to contracts between minors. In those cases, it is perhaps not best to defer
the private a rrangem ents of the parties .
254

Contrac ting with a new pa rtner if the form er pa rtner aba ndo ns w ould be akin to a right to
mitigate damages. Given the dignity and privacy concerns involved in a new contract, there should be a
right bu t not a d uty to m itigate.
255

A mother (or father) should not be able to force an abandonment by the other parent by
refusing to let th e noncusto dial parent visit. T he noncustod ial parent has legally enforceable righ ts to visit
until he has aba ndo ned .
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relationship with the mother and/or the child is irrelevant. This might change, at least for some
fathers, if the law took the notion of contract more seriously.
In cases of explicit contract, the obligation owed by the father would be determined by
the explicit contract or the background rules the law imposed on those contracts. For instance, in
cases of marriage or adoption, the law might demand that a person who explicitly contracts to be
a father is contracting to be a father for the entire minority of the child. Even if the marriage
only lasted two years, the father would be obligated as father for 18 years of the children’s lives
because that is what he agreed to.256 An agreement to marry would be a legal agreement to share
parenting during and after the relationship, just as an agreement to marry is a legal agreement to
share income streams during and after the marriage.257 These cases would look identical to what
we have today and the award could be established under the current income percentage guideline
system.
In cases of implicit contract, however, the law might make the child support obligation
proportional to the interdependence within the family.

If one discerns parental status from the

behavior of the mother and father, not from their explicit agreement, one must ask what that
behavior tells us about the duration of the obligation. Is it appropriate to discern an 18 year
commitment from a relationship that lasted two years? The answer could be yes simply because
we can impute to any potential father the responsibility for understanding that fatherhood is
permanent. The problem with this answer is that even now when the law says that fatherhood is
permanent, a vast number of children and fathers fail to experience it that way. Why should we
expect men to understand the inevitability of something that is demonstrably not inevitable?
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Most states extend the child support obligation through the age of majority. Some states
exte nd the ob ligation beyond that if the ch ild is purs uing high s cho ol or college edu cation . See E LLMAN
AL ., supra note 110 at 498-99 .
257

All states have maintenance laws which, depending on the circumstances of the marriage,
entitle on e sp ous e to a sha re of the other s pou se’s incom e stre am at leas t for a tim e. Id. at 396-99 .
Maintenance obligations, like the parenting obligations discussed here, largely depend on the length of
the re lationship an d the deg ree o f relianc e. Id. at 394-95.
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Why not hold men responsible for an obligation defined by the extent of the relationship?258
For instance, if the family existed as a family for seven years, the father could be
obligated as a family member for another seven years. At the end of those additional seven years
his contractual obligation would be fulfilled and he could cease payment. He would also,
however, lose his parental status. The extent of the relationship would determine the extent of
the obligation. He would be bound while separated for as long a period of time as he was
together with the family unit.259 Every year that he demonstrates his desire to be a part of the
family, enjoys the benefits of family and lets the other family members come to rely on him as a
member of the unit, he incurs a year of post-separation obligation. Every year that the mother
lets him parent, she incurs a year of post-separation infringement on her parental rights.260

If the

noncustodial parent does not want to lose his parental status at the end of his required obligation
(seven years in the above example), he should be allowed to maintain his parental status by
maintaining his obligation. That is, he can opt into permanent parental status. A person who has
acted as a parent for the full length of the contract and whom the mother has accepted as a parent
should be able to maintain that status permanently.261 Thus, the ability to terminate the
relationship at the contract’s end would be vested solely in the noncustodial parent, likely the
father. This would minimize the chances that children would have to suffer the loss of a parent.
At a theoretical level, this regime differs substantially from the regime we have now, but
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Again, the notion of letting the interdependencies developed during a relationship determine
the obligations after the relationship has recently been adopted by the ALI in its treatment of cohabiting
cou ples. ALI, supra note 153 , at § 6.0 2. Adopting the regime suggested here would simply expand the
areas in which the law lets lived rela tion ships, tha t is, im plicit contracts, dictate post-relationship
respon sibilities.
259

These numbers are just suggestions. A state could also decide to make som eone bound for
twice as lon g as he had a ctua lly acted as a fa m ily mem ber o r for half as long.
260

Indeed, by letting him in at all, she m ay lose the righ t to ever regain ex clusive parenta l rights
bec aus e he can exe rcise his op tion to be a perm ane nt parent.
261

That permanent status could be terminated by the state only upon a finding of abuse or

neg lect.
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in practice, the number of payments might well be similar. The separated father who meets his
obligation for the full contract term is likely to be concerned and involved enough with his
children’s lives to maintain his support. If he wants to maintain his rights to see his children, he
will have to maintain his support.262 He will stay father for eighteen years.
Many fathers who are supposed to stay fathers for eighteen years under the current regime
do not, however. They abandon two to three years after separation. A regime that explicitly
limited their obligation would not make much difference. At the margin, in some cases, one
might see a difference.

For instance, a man who was only obligated for three years might only

pay for three years, whereas now, because he’s obligated for fifteen years he pays for five years.
This is possible, but highly speculative; the fathers that pay are likely to visit and if they visit
they are not likely to want to relinquish their parental status.
As it is now, there is a hesitancy to hold non-biologically related men who have clearly
been a part of a family unit to the obligations they have incurred as part of the unit precisely
because their behavior does not seem to warrant holding them responsible for the child’s full
minority; the current law does not have a way of holding them responsible for something though
less than everything. The rigidity of the system now, both in terms of who is responsible for
paying and what he is responsible for paying may help make uniform the awards that courts
order, but there is no place in the current system for multiple or serial fathers. This means that
men who gain the benefits of parenthood are often left free to ignore the burdens of parenthood,
and some men who have never enjoyed the benefits of parenthood because they never wanted it,
are nonetheless required to pay.263
Using the construct of contract doctrine further, courts could determine child support with
reference to the damages suggested by the contract. Whether one labels these damages
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Otherwise he wou ld be in brea ch a nd the m othe r would be able to con tract w ith som eon e else .
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The ALI’s custody and visitation provisions foresee multiple adults having visitation privileges,
but they don ’t envision very m any m ultiple or s erial so urces o f child s upp ort. Compare ALI, supra note
153 at § 2.03 with § 3 et seq.
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reasonable reliance or expectation damages, the calculation would likely be the same. Parents
rely on other parents by incurring debt, forgoing jobs and forgoing other relationships that might
bring in more money. The longer a family unit lasts, the greater the reliance, the more
reasonable the expectation that the support will continue and the larger the number of
opportunities to contract with someone else that will have passed by. The child support award
should reflect those costs.264
This is not to say that child support awards should be the reliance or expectation measure,
per se. To make it such would assume that the noncustodial parent was necessarily the breaching
party. Not only would this run the risk of re-introducing problematic fault determinations into
family law,265 it would necessarily make the financial cost of break-up for the non-custodial
parent greater than the cost of break-up on the custodial parent. The custodial parent would not
have to bear any of the costs associated with losing the economies of scale that accompany
shared living space.266 Although it might be nice to spare the child the cost of those lost
economies, such an approach is not realistic and unfair to non-custodial parents who may not
have done anything wrong. Instead, reliance and expectation measures should be used as a
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It is important to remem ber, though, that a decision to discontinue employment or education or
to forego a m ore lucrative job because o f the support som eone else is providing is only reason able if there
are sound reasons to presume that the source of support will continue. An explicit promise to provide
sup port w ould provide reaso nab le ass uran ce o f long term sup port a s wo uld a long-te rm relationship. In
those cases, the dependent parent might be entitled to something like reliance damages. Relying on a
short term relationship (for instance, one year) to provide long term support would not be reasonable. The
dam ages in a short term rela tion ship should be m ore lim ited pre cisely because it would be unreasonable
to assum e that a short term com m itment is a long term com m itment.
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Although som e ha ve argue d that the ad vent of no-fault divorce hurt w om en financ ially, see
L ENORE J. W EITZMAN , T HE D IVORCE R E V O L U T IO N (1985), there is not a huge cry, from fem inists or others,
for the re-establishment of fault determinations. Few people seem to relish the idea of a third party judge
with no previous kno wledge of the parties deciding who was m ore at fault in the relationship. Moreo ver,
from a feminist perspective, a fault regime m ight hurt women even m ore than they are currently hurt by
divorce law. W omen institute divorce proceedings more often then men do. Margaret F. Brinig & Douglas
W . Allen, “These Boots Are Made for W alking”: W hy Most Divorce Filers Are Wom en, 2 A M . L & E C O N .
R EV . 126, 126-27 (200 0).
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For an analysis of the impact of family dissolution on the collective standards of living, see
E LLMAN ET AL ., supra note 110 , at 315-20 (“Maintenance of two households requires duplication of
expen diture, particularly for housing and transportation and entails lost econom ies of scale.”)
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ceiling from which to determine the child support award. From that ceiling, judges can
determine an appropriate child award measure, taking into account the costs that will be
associated with the noncustodial parent having to establish a home for himself.267
Admittedly, child support awards under such a system would be harder to determine and
more variable than they are now. Some readers may legitimately question whether contract law
is up to the task of determining what the award should be. Figuring out the primary caretaker’s
reliance or expectation interest will be very difficult. Indeed, it is a difficulty that, historically,
family law was familiar with. Before the federal legislation requiring uniform percentage grid
systems for determining child support,268 family court judges around the country had very little
guidance on what standards should be used to determine child support. Several studies
concluded that this led to wildly erratic system, both because of too few awards of child support
being ordered269 and because of too much variability in the awards that were made.270 The
percentage grid system brought a great deal of wanted consistency to child support awards.271
The grid system is popular and works well in many contexts, but it seems ill-suited to
deal with situations in which notions of fatherhood (or parenthood) are contested. It is one thing
to say that someone who everyone agrees is and should be treated as a father as traditionally
understood must pay 20% or 25% of his income in child support regardless of how well that
percentage figure actually reflects the caretaker’s reliance or need. It is another thing to say that
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W hat should not be subtracted from the reliance ceiling is the costs a noncustodial parent may
incur with new children. The parties m ay be aske d to share, to som e extent, the inevitable cost of a
break-up, but the custodial parent should not be asked to bear the burdens of future relationships from
which sh e ge ts no ben efit.
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See supra text accompanying notes 20-24.
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See Nancy T hoe nne s et al., The Impact of Child Support Guidelines on Award Adequacy,
Award Variability and Case Processing Efficiency, 25 FAM . L. Q. 3 25, 326 (1 991 ) (citing s tudies ). I
Garfinkel and P. W ong, Child Support and Public Policy (Nov. 1987) (paper presented at the Prganization
for Economic Cooperation and Develpment, Paris)
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someone who never intended to be or acted as father should be so responsible, and it is still
another thing to say that someone who never explicitly accepted the responsibilities of
fatherhood but nonetheless let others reasonably rely on him as a father for a period of years
should be responsible for paying 20% of his income in child support for the full period of the
child’s minority. This latter man is a father of sorts, but should he be a father forever?
If one answers yes to that question and is comfortable holding temporary or implicit
fathers responsible for supporting a child for the full term of the child’s minority then one can
simply use the grid. The grid system could apply to anyone who is a father and one need not
look t contract doctrine to help craft an award. In such a regime, we would use on contract law
only to determine who the father is, not what he owes. At the other extreme, if one thinks the
contract regime should be adopted in total, then we should abandon the grid system altogether
and let the wording and/or nature of the adult contract always determine the extent of the parental
obligation. This article endorses a middle course, one that uses the popular uniform grid system
in cases where there is ready consensus on who the father is and on the scope of his obligation,272
but one that endorses more of a reliance based system in cases where paternal status is more
tenuous and the scope of the obligation more ambiguous.
Thus, under the system proposed here, most of the men held responsible now and any
man who willingly opted into the status of permanent father could still be bound by the current
guidelines. Remember, though, that many of the men who would be held responsible under a
contract regime currently have no liability under the guidelines because they are not the
biological fathers of the child. The contract-based support amount would most likely apply to
unmarried biological fathers who currently pay sporadically and incompletely and to nonbiological fathers who rarely pay anything at all.
As it is now, the determining factor in whether a non-biological father owes anything is
often whether the biological father can be found. This is an arbitrary system that makes

272
This would probably be the case in marriage situations or situations in which there was an
exp licit prom ise to a cce pt the resp ons ibilities o f fatherho od.
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nonbiological father’s obligation a function of what someone else does, and a biological father’s
obligation a function of his sexual conduct, not his parenting conduct. The regime offered here
would eliminate that arbitrariness. Parents who have parented would be obligated as parents.
This regime would be harder to administer because it is nuanced, but it is nuanced in a way that
reflects the reality of contemporary parenting. A more flexible, albeit potentially more variable
system stands a better chance of making men who currently act as fathers, responsible as fathers.

D. Examples
Some examples may help bring the various strands of this proposal together.
1. The Easy Cases
Frank, a New York City police officer made famous in print and on film for his
willingness to expose corruption in the Police Department, slept with a woman named Pamela,
who told him she was using birth control when she knew that she was not.273 Pamela got
pregnant and sued Frank for child support. In 1983, a New York court found Frank liable for
child support in an amount proportional to what he earned.274 Under the proposed regime, Frank
would not be liable for child support, nor would he have any rights as a father. The rights and
responsibilities for any child born of the sexual liaison would be vested in Pamela alone unless
and until she found someone else willing to assume the role of father.
Tamara Budnick and Frederick Silverman signed an agreement in which they agreed that
Frederick would not assume any responsibility for a child born of their sexual liaison.275 In 2002,
a Florida court found Silverman responsible for child support notwithstanding the contract.
Under the proposed regime, he would not be responsible because the contract clearly indicates
his intent not to parent.
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See Carbon ne, supra note at 248.
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See In re Pamela S., supra note 26. For the story of Frank Serpico’s career, see P E T ER M ASS ,
S E R P IC O (1973).
275

See Bud nick , supra no te 22.
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Ann and Dudley Nygard met in July of 1982.276 In October of 1982, Ann discovered that
she was 5 months pregnant. Dudley asked Ann to stay with him, notwithstanding both of their
knowledge that the pregnancy could not have resulted from their sexual activity. He also agreed
“to raise the child as his own.”277 Ann and Dudley married in December of 1982 and separated
in May of 1984. A Michigan court ordered Dudley to pay child support, finding either that the
oral contract was enforceable, of, if barred by the statute of frauds, that Dudley was bound under
doctrines of equitable or promissory estoppel.278 Under the current regime, the case would come
out precisely the same way, either because of Dudley’s explicit promise to act as father or
because, by marrying Ann he agreed to be a father to any children born of the marriage.279
Stephen and Robin Markov were married in 1986.280 Ten months later, Robin gave birth
to twins. After a rocky marriage, the parties separated in March of 1997. The parties agreed that
by 1992, both realized that the twins were not Stephen’s biological issue. Nonetheless, Stephen
continued to see the twins and make child support payments until May of 1998. At that time,
Stephen denied responsibility for supporting the twins based on his lack of biological connection.
A Maryland court found that Stephen could be held responsible for child support,
notwithstanding the lack of genetic connection, but only upon Robin presenting sufficient
evidence that the biological father could not be found.281 Under the proposed regime, the
presence of the biological father would be irrelevant. Stephen would be held responsible as
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See Nygard, supra note 148.
Id. at 323.
Id. at 99 , 100.
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The m arital contrac t has never be en s ubje ct to the statute of fraud s.
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See Ma rkov, sup ra no te 45.
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Id. at 31 1-31 2.
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father and would have rights as father because he agreed to raise children born to the marriage.282
2. The Harder Cases
Amy and Tom dated fairly regularly but were not married. Amy got pregnant. Tom
supported her emotionally and with some financial assistance throughout the pregnancy. He was
present at the birth of the child (Lisa) and stayed as a regular presence in Amy and Lisa’s life
until Lisa was three years old. He contributed to Amy’s household, paying for food, clothes and
other expenses for the Lisa. By the time Lisa was three, Tom began to drift away. He was
around much less and contributed almost nothing. By the time Lisa was four, Amy no longer
knew where he was.
At this point, Amy could sue for paternity. The suit would be based on an implicit
promise to support though, not on Tom’s blood relationship to Lisa. The facts of this paternity
case would look remarkably similar to the average facts alleged in paternity suits now. As
mentioned, most fathers sued in paternity were present for the birth of the child and remained in
a relationship with the mother for two to three years after the child’s birth.283 What would likely
be different is the extent of Tom’s obligation. Tom would be liable for an amount of support that
reflected Ann’s reasonable reliance on his contributions. He would be liable for, for instance,
three years of subsequent support. During those three years he would have full parental rights. If
he paid for those three years - and at any time prior to the end of those three years - he would
have the right to opt into permanent parental status. If he did so, the amount of his obligation
would be determined by standard child support guidelines.
If Amy did not sue Tom for paternity, it is very likely that another man (call him Bill)
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If the parties wanted to contract out of the marital presumption ex ante, there would be no
reason not to le t the m . Thus, p arties could design a m arital presum ptio n that applied only in cases in
which the children were biologically related. For policy reasons, though , the state should probably require
tha t su ch a contract include a provision req uiring genetic te stin g at birth s o that th e parties would kn ow all
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would enter Amy and Lisa’s life and assume a parent-like role.284 As Bill provided continuing
emotional and financial support to Amy and Lisa’s household, he would make himself potentially
responsible and potentially protected as a father. Whether Bill became legally responsible would
depend on whether Tom had drifted away. If Tom was an obvious presence in Lisa’s life, then
there could be no reasonable reliance on Bill as father. However, if Tom ceased acting as father,
he would be deemed to have abandoned his paternal relationship, and Bill could assume that role
either explicitly or implicitly.

Again, the facts of this situation are perfectly common.285 If Amy

and Bill explicitly agreed that Bill should assume parental status, the situation would be
functionally identical to the hundreds of step-parent adoptions that currently happen every year in
this country.286 Bill would be the equivalent of a step-parent adopter and Tom’s right would be
terminated during that adoption proceeding.287 What would be different is if Amy and Bill did
not explicitly agree that Bill would assume parental status. Under the proposed model, a court
should be free to infer such an agreement in the absence of explicit words or contract. Once that
agreement can be inferred from the parties behavior, Bill can sue Amy to maintain contact with
Lisa if Amy tries to bar him from such, and Ann can sue Bill for support if Bill drifts away like
Tom did.
3. The Modern Cases
Dick and Fred are a gay couple that wants to have a child. Dick enters into a surragacy
arrangement with Beth. Either using an ovam purchased from someone else or using Beth’s
ovum, Beth is impregnated with Dick’s sperm. Pursuant to the surrogacy contract, Beth
284
Serial fatherhood is comm on. See Dowd, supra note 50 at 28-29 and “parenting is rarely done
in isolation .” Id. at 205.
285

Id.
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To be a step-parent adoption, Ann and Bill would have to marry first, but the point is that the
growing trend if for courts to be particularly willing to let a “new parent” become “the other parent” fi the
first parent has not met the responsibilities of parenthood. See E LLMAN ET AL ., supra note 110 at 1398139 9.
287
See for instan ce, In the M atter of JJJ, 718 P.2 d 94 8 (Alask a, 1986) (first fath er’s paren tal rights
term inated whe n step-pa rent w ante d to adop t).
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relinquishes all her parental rights at birth. If Dick has not previously signed a parenting
agreement with Fred, Dick is the sole parent. If Dick and Fred have signed a parenting
agreement, Dick and Fred are the co-parents to the child born as a result of the surrogacy
agreement.
Laura is a single woman. She wants to be a mother. She convinces her friend Gary to
have intercourse with her in the hope that she will get pregnant. Laura and Gary never discuss
Gary’s future role as a father. Laura gets pregnant and gives birth to Billy. During the pregnancy
and after birth Laura and Gary maintain their friendship. Gary sees Billy from time to time,
often bringing him gifts. The relationship between Laura and Gary cannot be considered
interdependent. They do not live together; they do not provide for each other economically; they
do not make mutual decisions about Billy’s well-being; Laura does not rely on Gary for care or
support of Billy. . Laura cannot sue Gary for child support and Gary cannot sue Laura for
parental rights.288 If Laura chooses to, she can marry or otherwise contract with another man or
woman. It would be by virtue of that subsequent contract that Billy would acquire a second
parent.

IV. Advantages and Disadvantages

Using contract doctrine as a construct through which to interpret parental status offers a
more coherent paradigm than does the current system. It also does a better job of incorporating
contemporary mores and contemporary technology. In addition, it has positive policy
implications. It also has some negative policy implications. This section looks at the policy
advantages and disadvantages of a parental status regime based on contract.
A. Advantages

288

Com pare Jhordan c. v. Mary K., supra note 40. (Sperm donor friend who visited with child and
rem ained friendly with m oth er held to be legal fa the r be cause there was no evidence that th e parties did
not intend him to be. Under the proposed regime, the burden would be on the person trying to establish
parenthood to prove intent, not on the person denying parenthood to prove lack of intent.)
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The proposed model embraces two major distinctions that contemporary family law
ignores: first, the distinction between mothers and fathers (or primary caretakers and secondary
caretakers),289 and second, distinctions between fathers. In doing so it eliminates two distinctions
that currently have great salience in the law of parenthood; the distinction between
“technologically produced” and “regularly produced” children, and the distinction between
straight parents and gay parents.290 The proposed model eliminates the current distinction
between technologically produced children and others by adopting the model that we currently
use for determining the parenthood of technologically produced children: contract. Under the
proposed regime as under the contemporary law of reproductive technologies, preconception
intent, as manifested in an agreement with the gestational mother, would be the critical factor in
determining parenthood at birth, and post-conception intent, as manifested, implicitly or
explicitly, in an agreement with the primary caretaker, would be the critical factor in determining
parental rights and obligations as the child grows.

The proposed model eliminates the

distinction between gay and straight parents also because it acknowledges that one gains parental
status not by a biological connection to the child but by contributing to and situating oneself in
the interdependence of a family structure that includes children. Whereas courts now often
struggle to determine the status of the non-biological gay parent/partner, under the proposed
regime it would be clear. That person, man or woman, is the “father” and she or he is the father
by virtue of an agreement with the mother.
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It is imp ortant to emp hasize here that not all fam ily structures will have prim ary and secon dary
caretak ers. If two adults who had truly shared both careta kin g and support obligation s were to split up, it
would be clear that both adults had parental status and that both adults shared parental obligation. The
contract would dictate that each party continue sharing, both the rights and obligations, as they had been
doing. Se e text acc om pan ying note 291.
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Argu ably the prop ose d m ode l replac es d istinction s m ade pos sible by mode rn so ciety with
distinctions that had more relevance historically. Technologically-produced children and same-gender
parents are new phenomena that have salience. Though tender years presumptions, alimony laws and
legitimacy doctrine used to mak e distinctions between mothers and fathers and between fathers, those
doctrines have de creased in im portance rece ntly. I am arguing that these m uch older distinctions are
actua lly m ore re levant tha n the m odern ones, th ough for very different reasons than those that histo rically
justified them .
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At this point, readers concerned about sex equality are probably bristling at the labels of
mother and father. How can we achieve sex equality, much less degender caretaking, 291 if we
structure the law of parenthood around the very sex differences that we are trying to eliminate?
As mentioned in the introduction, this article uses the term mother in its biological and social
sense, but not necessarily in the sense that it means “female parent.” Comparably, it uses the term
father to mean “partner of mother” not necessarily “male parent.”

I do this, following Martha

Fineman’s lead,292 to ensure that what has legal meaning and value is precisely the biological and
cultural contributions that mothers have traditionally made. What need not be salient is the sex
of the person parenting. If a man is mothering a child because the female parent has abandoned
the child, or for any other reason, then the law should treat that man as a mother. If a woman is
fathering a child by supporting the family structure economically while someone else is doing
more of the caretaking, then the law should treat that woman as a father. If both parents are
doing identical jobs, then the labels are irrelevant anyway. For the most part, the law needs to be
concerned with the rights and obligations of parenthood only when a family unit breaks up and
the parties look to the law to determine relative responsibilities. The labels of mother and father
are remarkably unimportant at that stage because the contract analogy proposed suggests that the
rights and obligations should be based on the established pattern of behavior of the family as it
existed when it was intact. Which sex held which role is irrelevant. The rights and obligations
follow the established role, not gender.
Of course, the one place where sex is salient is at birth. Men cannot mother a child in
utero. For those primarily concerned with degendering all notions of parenthood, a regime that
not only acknowledges but rewards women’s gestational labor may seem problematic. On the
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On the im portance of de gendering ca retaking, that is, spreading the co sts of caring for others
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other hand, for many, much of the law’s current refusal to acknowledge or reward women’s
gestational labor seems extraordinarily unjust. As discussed, men simply cannot invest what
women must invest in pregnancy, and what women must invest is huge. Rewarding that
investment with superior rights simply reflects a principle basic to the common law293 and to
more recent trends in family law: rewarding investment with rights.294 Refusing to honor what is
unquestionably a greater contribution smacks more of oppression than equality.295 Thus, the
reward that the proposed model offers to gestational mothers is not offered as a retreat from
ideals of gender equality, but as an embracing of those ideals. Only if we recognize and reward
the labor that women have always done and, to a large extent, continue to do, can we expect a
world of meaningful equality.
The distinction between mothers and fathers proposed here builds on Martha Fineman’s
suggestion to restructure the family relationship around the caretaking-based parent-child dyad
instead of the sexually-based husband-wife dyad. By making the gestational mother-child
relationship primary, the proposed model gives significant parenting power to women. It also,
like Fineman’s model, helps unmask dependencies that the sexual family model hides.
Fineman, more than any other feminist or family scholar, has made us all realize how much
dependencies beget dependencies. By taking care of dependents, caretakers become dependent
because the person in need of care demands the time, resources and energy that the caretaker
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would otherwise use to take care of herself.296 The proposed model recognizes that women often
try to meet these dependencies by entering into relationships with others. It recognizes that in
meeting those dependencies men must not be viewed simply as generous philanthropists, but as
individuals willingly undertaking obligations in return for benefits. It forces men to take their
family obligations seriously because it holds them responsible only for those obligations that they
have willfully accepted.
Where this proposal differs from Fineman’s is in its ability to incorporate fathers and
reward them when they deserve it. As I have argued elsewhere, a world in which women have all
the parental power and all the parental responsibility is not necessarily a feminist ideal.297 The
evidence suggests that the vast majority of mothers want to share the rights and responsibilities
of parenthood with someone else.298 Women want someone with whom to share the physical,
financial and emotional burdens and they want someone with whom to share the joy. For many
parents, it is simply more fun to parent together than apart. In order to make it worthwhile to
men for them to share in the hard and the fun, the law must be prepared to honor the sacrifices
they make and the desires they demonstrate to parent.
By honoring those sacrifices and desires, the proposed model draws men into the family
unit, but in a much more rational and just fashion than does contemporary paternity law. Instead
of relying on confused and inconsistent invocations of punishment and deterrence, the proposed
model links parental status to a willful acceptance of parental responsibility. Instead of assuming
that genetic contribution gives rise to moral responsibility, the proposed model assumes that
parental participation gives rise to moral responsibility. Instead of assuming, without
explanation, that the child’s entitlement must be tied to the parent’s income, the proposed model
links the child’s entitlement to what the child and his or her primary caretaker have bargained for
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and come to rely on. It also links parental obligation to parental rights in a way that can explain
why someone must continue to pay support even if he is not acting as a parent. He must continue
to pay because he agreed to pay. By rooting parental status in contract, the proposed model
provides a unified understanding of where parental rights and obligations come from, while still
recognizing that different contracts will require different remedies. It makes distinctions between
different kinds of fathers in order to make sense of legal fatherhood.
As should be clear, also, by dispensing with biology as the nominal sin quo non of
fatherhood, we are not likely to be dispensing with the biparenting norm that paternity doctrine
currently reifies. The great majority of children will have at least two parents because most
mothers share parental status at some point during a child’s life.299 Moreover, the two parents
they have will be individuals who chose parenthood, not individuals on whom the law imposed
parental status. Some children may have mothers who chose not to parent with somebody else.
Other children may have fathers who abandon them after a time. The children in either of these
categories would, of course, find plenty of similarly situated friends among the children in our
current regime. Today, the children of women who are not married and have not previously
agreed to share parental rights when they choose to buy sperm, have no fathers. Comparably,
children of women who are not married and have not previously agreed to share parental rights
when they have sex often raise the child without a father and refuse to pursue the biological
father in paternity. Other single women who want to parent and are tired of or uninterested in
waiting for marriage simply choose to adopt.300 There is little reason to believe the proposed
model will increase the number of children in these categories.301 As many children as have
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fathers today will likely have fathers under the new regime, but they will have fathers who
willingly assumed the role.302
I consider the foregoing to be advantages of the proposed regime. Eliminating distinctions
that needlessly exclude deserving people from parental status while at the same time recognizing
that varying kinds of investment and commitment should give rise to proportional rights and
obligations are positive developments for the law of parenthood. The proposed regime brings
disadvantages also, however, most notably the problem of cost.
B. Disadvantages
The current system ensures that, except for children born to single women by virtue of
artificial insemination, there are always two potential sources of financial support for a child and
it mandates that each potential source pay a given percentage of his or her income. Thus, the
current system helps eschew state responsibility for children. More single mothers may be in
need of financial help in the proposed regime because they will not be able to pursue the
biological father of the child for the full percentage of his income that the current regime makes
him responsible for paying to her.

This could be a considerable disadvantage.

It also might not make much difference. Most of the child support that gets paid, gets
paid voluntarily.303 Almost half of the of unwed women who could pursue the biological father
for paternity, choose not to.304 Those that do make paternity claims can usually base the claim on
relationship as well as blood.305 Moreover, regardless of the theory of their claims, most unwed
mothers have precious little to gain, even if their claims are successful. The average unwed
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father earns just over $16,000 a year.306 Money spent on enforcement might be more efficiently
spent on a direct subsidy to children. Also, of course, in the proposed regime, there would be
more money coming from a source that is now only tapped sporadically, non-biological fathers
who have acted as fathers. Thus, it is actually quite hard to estimate how much more a contract
regime would cost.
Even if the proposed system did require greater governmental expenditure on children,
however, budgeting for those resources would do nothing more grave than bring the United
States up to par with the rest of the industrialized world. The current scheme in this country,
which assumes bilateral obligation stemming from blood and assumes that two parents acting
alone should be able to meet all of the needs of children, is followed virtually nowhere else in the
world. As mentioned earlier, with the exceptions of China and the United States, every
industrialized country has a family allowance program that provides regular cash payments to
families with children regardless of need.307 Some of these programs are employer based; others
are run completely by the government.308 Many of these countries also supplement the basic
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family allowance amount in single-parent households.309 In other words, most of the
industrialized world does not consider the dependency of youth a matter of private concern.310 If
the United States could sever its allegiance to privatizing the dependency of youth, the proposed
contractual framework would appear both less radical and less costly. The fact is that there are
young dependents, just as there are old dependents, who need our collective help because taking
care of them is more than any one person can manage on his or her own. Collective
responsibility for children should follow from the fact that children, like the elderly, are needy,
not from the fact that they are fatherless.
There are any of a number of ways that the polity could meet this collective
responsibility. First, of course, any extra money needed in light of an altered system of parental
status could come from general revenue. Rhetorically, it is very easy for politicians to talk about
supporting children. The proposed regime would give them a reason and a way to implement
that support. Alternatively, some sort of payroll tax, not unlike the current FICA system, could
amply supply a family allowance program designed to give dependency assistance. Much greater
per child tax deductions, coupled with a program that adequately provided for children whose
parents were earning too little to take advantage of tax deductions, could also achieve the desired
goals.
Moreover, as suggested earlier, if we are deeply concerned about the moral obligation or
deterrent functions that a biologically-based paternity system may serve, a tax on biological
fathers could serve those functions just as well while providing additional income for children.
Again looking at the United States’ peer countries, most biological fathers pay something
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towards support of their children, but what they pay is a fraction of the subsidy that caretaker’s
receive. The government assumes the primary responsibility for providing a minimum standard
of support.311 Moreover, these biological fathers usually have limited, if any, parental rights.312
What this means is that men have less of a need to avoid detection (because they will not be
responsible for that much support) and mothers have less need to hide the biological father’s
identity (because he cannot meaningfully interfere with her parental rights). These differences
may well account for the vastly different rates of paternity establishment in the United States and
its peer countries.

In most of the United States’ peer countries, the paternity establishment rate

for children of unmarried mothers hovers around 90%.313 In the United States, it is 30%.314
Thus, perhaps ironically, making biological fatherhood significantly less important legally, may
make it easier to find and secure money from biological fathers.
A tax on biological fathers would not provide all of the funding needed, but it could help
defray the cost. It would also not make men fathers in either the financial or the social sense
because fatherhood would come from relationship not blood.

Men would have status as fathers

not because women and children need support, but because the men have meaningfully
participated as family members.

V. Conclusion

There is a great deal of discussion these days about both genetics and fatherhood. On
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what seems like a daily basis, the biological sciences make new discoveries about the relevance
of biology in our lives.315 Comparably, the debate within the social sciences about the
importance of fathers in children’s lives rages on.316 There can be little doubt that both genes
and fathers (or, more precisely, two parent families) matter, but there are loads of reasons to
doubt that a genetic father matters.
This article has shown that the law has always been willing and at times eager to dismiss
the importance of the genetic connection. It has dismissed the importance of that connection
most often when there is a different relevant connection, between the mother and another man, in
the child’s life. It is increasingly dismissing the importance of genetic connection when genetics
are separated from sexual activity. The advances in technology that allow us to learn more about
the role of genetics in our lives also make it possible to distill genetics from gestation, sexual
activity, and intent to be a parent. The more these previously inseparable factors can be isolated,
the more the law must come to terms with how important each factor is to determining parental
status. Intent to parent is emerging as the primary determinant of parental status. Relaxed social
norms with regard to sexual behavior and parenting patterns are also forcing courts to confront
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equitable claims to parenthood when there is indisputably no genetic connection. Courts
receptivity to these claims turns largely on the extent to which the mother and father figure seem
to have manifested a mutual intent to parent.
This trend away from genetics and towards contract is a positive development. It is a
development that reconciles paternity precedent with technological advances, legal norms with
parenting practices and sexual mores with parental obligations. It is a development that makes
every parent-child relationship a wanted parent-child relationship. The science of genetics
increasingly tells us who we are. It need not tell us who our parents are.
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